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SOCIAL FRAMEWORK STUDIES SUCH AS
WOMEN DON’T ASK AND IT DOES HURT TO ASK
SHOW US THE NEXT STEP TOWARD ACHIEVING
GENDER EQUALITY—ELIMINATING THE LONG-TERM
EFFECTS OF IMPLICIT BIAS—BUT ARE NOT LIKELY TO
GET CASES PAST SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ANDREA DONEFF*
[O]ur journey is not complete until our wives, our
mothers, and daughters can earn a living equal to
their efforts.1
ABSTRACT
Lawyers and judges long have relied on outside evidence—usually
studies or empirical research—to help them better understand the
impact or meaning of the facts in certain cases. In employment cases,
lawyers have used studies that show statistical variance in hiring or
promotion between men and women to prove discrimination. They
have used studies that talk about implicit bias, the kind of bias that
we apply without even knowing we are biased, perhaps the kind of
bias we apply even when we are doing our best not to be biased, to
understand that comments like “You should go to charm school” indi-
cate sex-based stereotyped thinking. But they have not successfully
used (and few appear even to have attempted to use) recent studies
that tie together actions over a long period of time with a seemingly
unrelated adverse employment action. These connections are much
less obvious than those between “charm school” and sex-based stereo-
typing. They require a court to look at the long term cumulative ef-
fects of bias—not an if-then analysis but an understanding of the
whole employment relationship, as explained with the help of these
and related studies.
This Article focuses on two studies (really one study and its re-
lated predecessor) and argues that they change the way we should
look at the difficult individual disparate impact case, especially when
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combined with other social science research. The first study shows
what many people accept from experience—that women simply do not
negotiate on their own behalf.2 The follow up study, much more im-
portant for purposes of this Article, shows that women who do nego-
tiate might get what they negotiated for, but end up being perceived
negatively thereafter by both the men and the women they work with.3
In a case where the effects of discrimination manifest over time and
cannot be tied directly to a specific employment event, convincing
a judge to use the study to fill in the gaps in evidence and let a case
past summary judgment could be crucial to closing the gender gap.
Unfortunately, although juries might make good use of the
studies, judges who tend to grant summary judgment in discrimina-
tion cases are not likely to be persuaded that the studies, even paired
with other illuminating studies, provide a sufficient “social frame-
work” to get a case to a jury without significant and recent witness
or documentary evidence.4 Employment lawyers will not risk the ex-
pense to hire the expert necessary to make the argument.5 The studies
will have little impact, even though they present essential informa-
tion that should cause both employers and employees to question
and perhaps modify their decisions and motivations.
INTRODUCTION
A. The Weak Employment Case
B. The Studies
C. Juries Should See These Studies
I. SOCIAL FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS—WHAT IT IS, HOW IT IS
STUDIED, AND HOW IT APPLIES
A. How Social Frameworks Apply in Employment Cases
1. Analysis Under McDonnell Douglas
2. The Mosaic of Circumstances Analysis
3. Plaintiff Needs Only to Show That Discrimination
Was a Motivating Factor
4. How Social Framework Evidence Can Help in
Title VII Cases
2. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: THE HIGH COST OF
AVOIDING NEGOTIATION—AND POSITIVE STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 1 (Princeton Univ.
Press 2009).
3. Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock & Lei Lai, Social Incentives for Gender
Differences in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does Hurt to Ask, 103
ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 84, 86 (2007) [hereinafter Bowles, Babcock
& Lai, It Does Hurt to Ask].
4. Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 999
(2006).
5. Id. at 1002.
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II. HOW SOCIAL FRAMEWORK TESTIMONY HAS BEEN PROFFERED
IN DISCRIMINATION CASES
A. How Courts Have Allowed Social Framework Testimony
1. Some Courts Have Allowed Social Framework
Evidence in Class Actions or Actions on Behalf
of Groups
2. Some Courts Have Not Accepted the Proffered
Expert Testimony
B. Social Framework Research in Individual Disparate
Treatment Cases
1. Courts Have Allowed Social Framework Research in
Individual Disparate Treatment Cases
2. And Some Courts Have Not Allowed It or Have Given
It Little Weight
3. Cases Where the Lawyers Have Proffered the It Does
Hurt to Ask or Women Don’t Ask Studies
III. LAWYERS CAN USE THE STUDIES TO SHOW HOW BIAS CREATES
LONG-TERM AND CUMULATIVE EFFECTS RESULTING IN
DISCRIMINATORY DECISION-MAKING
A. It Takes Multiple Steps To See Discrimination When
Applying These Studies
B. The Facts of the Long-Term Discrimination Case, Even
Combined with Social Science Evidence, Provide Only a
Tenuous Link to the Ultimate Employment Decision
1. Arguments for Rejecting Social Framework
Testimony in Individual Disparate Treatment Cases
a. The Studies Are as Likely To Prove as Not Prove
Bias, Because Employees Cannot Control Their
Unconscious Biases
b. Pressure to Stop Implicit Bias May Make It Worse
c. How Will a Jury Respond to this Information?
i. Will a Jury Find Against an Employer
That Is Not Aware of its
Discriminatory Decisions?
ii. Will a Jury Understand the Testimony and
its Place in the Evidence?
2. These Arguments Should Not Convince a Court To
Reject the Bowles and Babcock Studies in Implicit
Bias Cases
3. Does Wal-Mart v. Dukes Make Attempting to
Introduce These Studies Pointless?
C. Why a Court Will Not Be More Likely to Deny Summary
Judgment with the Expert Testimony than Without
CONCLUSION
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INTRODUCTION
In their article Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination
Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, Linda Hamilton Krieger
and Susan T. Fiske discuss the concept of “behavioral realism,” a
theory that judges should use empirical and social evidence in their
cases, but that they should recognize that the science changes over
time and incorporate the changing science and should not cling to
outmoded ways of thinking.6
In the context of antidiscrimination law, behavioral realism stands
for the proposition that judicial models—of what discrimination
is, what causes it to occur, how it can be prevented, and how its
presence or absence can best be discerned in particular cases—
should be periodically revisited and adjusted so as to remain con-
tinuous with progress in psychological science.7
What the studies discussed here change about the judicial model
is that they make it abundantly clear that courts must step back and
allow juries to see cases that require a long-term view, not just the
circumstances directly surrounding the adverse employment decision.
In the context of the less-than-obvious sex discrimination case, recent
empirical research can and should be relied on by courts examining
cases to determine whether they raise sufficient evidence to get past
summary judgment. The discriminatory actions, comments, or effects
do not occur at the time of the employment decision. They occur spread
out over an employment experience, often seemingly unrelated to
the adverse employment action that finally prompted the litigation.
These studies show us how to understand that scenario.
Unfortunately, though, these studies do not “prove” that dis-
crimination occurred in the individual case; they merely explain how
it could have. Without evidence of causation between the factual evi-
dence produced and the allegedly discriminatory motive, these studies
are not likely to change the chances that a case will survive summary
judgment, though perhaps they should.
A. The Weak Employment Case
As an employment lawyer, I dreaded—and rejected—the “I know
it when I see it” gender discrimination cases. Those are the cases
where an employee would describe the situation leading to her failure
6. Id. at 997.
7. Id. at 1001.
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to be promoted, her lower salary or dead-end job placement, her slide
from star employee to persona non grata, or her termination despite
selling more products than the men all around her where that was
really all the proof she had. How do you prove discrimination when
you have one professional employee, doing a job that is similar to but
not the same as the men around her, who knows she has been dis-
criminated against but has no concrete proof—just circumstances that
lead a lawyer who has experience in discrimination cases to say “yes,
I see that discrimination too, but how can we prove it?”
The hardest cases of all are those where the effects of discrimi-
nation were compounded through years of working for a company—
starting with the initial salary negotiation, working through years
of wondering why the men got better projects, invited to the social
events, and then promoted or given raises before the women. Women
got some promotions, some good projects, and some raises, usually
when they negotiated for or insisted on them, followed some time
later either by a “layoff” where the woman was informed that her
services were no longer necessary or by an end to promotions within
the company and an unsatisfactory explanation.
B. The Studies
Shortly before I left practice and entered academia, I read the
studies that show statistically what women have said anecdotally
for years—women who are bright, capable, and marketable simply do
not negotiate on their own behalf in the same numbers or to the same
extent that men in comparable positions do.8 They do not negotiate
their initial salaries; they do not negotiate raises; they do not nego-
tiate promotions.9 The effects of this failure to negotiate are obvious:
lower pay over the years, failure to get the best assignments, fewer
promotions, etc.10
The authors of the study, known as Women Don’t Ask, have
followed it up with a book called Ask For It,11 which offers numerous
8. Bowles, Babcock & Lai, It Does Hurt to Ask, supra note 3, at 98–100.
9. Id. at 1–2.
10. ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE, STEPHEN J. ROSE & BAN CHEAH, THE COLLEGE PAYOFF:
EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONS, LIFETIME EARNINGS 2 (2011), available at https://georgetown
.app.box.com/s/cwmx7i5li1nxd7zt7mim (showing that women’s lifetime earnings grow
dramatically with education, but never get anywhere close to men’s—with a professional
degree, women earn approximately a million dollars less over their lifetime than men with
comparable education).
11. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, ASK FOR IT: HOW WOMEN CAN USE THE
POWER OF NEGOTIATION TO GET WHAT THEY REALLY WANT 75 (2009) [hereinafter ASK
FOR IT].
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tips on how women should negotiate—for example, using the argu-
ment that they are doing the best for the team, or that they were told
by someone else to ask for more, or by showing how important nego-
tiation skills are to their job.12 In other words, the book proposes that
women should negotiate as women are expected to negotiate—not just
because they’re worth it or they’ve earned it, but because it would be
good for the work community. Arguably this approach is both more
effective and easier for women who are understandably afraid to
negotiate on their own behalf.
This response to the study is disheartening. Why can’t we just
negotiate like a man: “I have made the company a lot of money and
deserve a raise?” Especially for women in fields that require them to
be aggressive, the assertive personality works to make the company’s
profits increase, but not the individual woman’s. And while women
have made huge strides, the pay gap, the promotion gap, and the re-
spect gap remain in every field, even after years of “consciousness
raising,” negotiation training, and article after article about how to
negotiate, including in fields like law where arguably women know
they need to negotiate and men know they cannot discriminate.13
Ultimately, it is not women’s leadership styles that need to change
but the structures and perceptions that must keep up with today’s
changing times. Companies versed in negotiating complex social
and financial interactions must help employees see that stereo-
types, like first impressions, are mutable—and not truths cast
in stone.14
12. Id. at 75–87. The book provides numerous guidelines throughout for women to use
in bargaining.
13. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have it All, THE ATLANTIC,
July/Aug. 2012, at 85; CHRISTIANNE CORBETT & CATHERINE HILL, GRADUATING TO A PAY
GAP: THE EARNINGS OF WOMEN AND MEN ONE YEAR AFTER COLLEGE GRADUATION, at vii
(2012), available at http://www.aauw.org/resource /graduating-to-a-pay-gap-the-earnings
-of-women-and-men-one-year-after-college-graduation/ (finding that women’s pay is less
than men’s already by one year after graduation, and that about one-third of the difference
cannot be accounted for by college major, occupation, or hours worked, but theorizing
that discrimination and failure to negotiate might account for at least some of the gap);
BARBARA M. FLOM, REPORT OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL NAWL SURVEY ON RETENTION AND
PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 3 (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/administrative/women/nawl_2012_survey_report_final.authcheckdam
.pdf (finding in large law firms, women make up fifteen percent of equity partners but just
under fifty percent  of associates and seventy percent of nonpartner track staff attorneys);
see also Gender Equity Task Force, AM. BAR ASSOC., http://www.americanbar.org/groups
/women/gender_equity_task_force.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014) (discussing the ABA’s
task force on gender equity and emphasis on equalizing compensation and opportunities
for women, at least in the legal profession).
14. CATALYST, THE DOUBLE-BIND DILEMMA FOR WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP: DAMNED IF
YOU DO, DOOMED IF YOU DON’T 2 (2007) [hereinafter THE DOUBLE-BIND DILEMMA]. This
study was cited in an amicus brief by The National Partnership For Women & Families
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The question remains why simply teaching women to negotiate
does not close the gap. Many studies assert that a significant part
of the problem is implicit bias—those biases we don’t even know we
have but that nonetheless affect our decisions.15 The more interest-
ing study, then, is the follow-up study to Women Don’t Ask, which
I will refer to as It Does Hurt to Ask.16 That study shows that, when
women do negotiate on their own behalf, women are perceived nega-
tively by both men and women.17 The result of this negative percep-
tion is pretty similar to the result of the failure to negotiate: lower
raises, failure to get the best assignments, fewer promotions, being
asked to join fewer boards than men, and not getting the top spots
in most companies.18 In the long term, though, the effects of negoti-
ating are devastating—negative perceptions lead people not to want
to work with you, not to ask you to lunch, not to consider you good or
nice enough to include on projects, and eventually to decide to termi-
nate the relationship. In other words, damned if you don’t, damned
if you do.19
That study was eye-opening to me. After reading the study I
knew logically as well as intuitively that my clients had good reason
to believe they were victims of discrimination. The study sets up a
whole different way of looking at discrimination litigation. Just look-
ing at the adverse employment action that prompted the claim and
even the totality of its immediately surrounding circumstances simply
cannot be enough in today’s employment setting. Decisions are not
made in a vacuum and must be seen in the context of the entire his-
tory of employment. Not just the other occurrences similar to the one
at issue and close in time, but also the successes, the relationships,
and perhaps other factors, regardless of how long ago they occurred.
The “totality of the circumstances” should not mean just what hap-
pened within a month or two of the termination. It must mean the
et al.—the same group that filed an amicus brief in the Lilly Ledbetter case—in Prowel v.
Wise Business Forms, 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009). A quick search did not find any cases
that cited this article.
15. See infra Part I.
16. Bowles, Babcock & Lai, It Does Hurt to Ask, supra note 3, at 99.
17. Id. at 84–103. Interestingly, the study showed that, while men were comfortable
with men who negotiated but not women, women disapproved of anyone who negotiated.
Id. at 85. A similar study was conducted by Laurie A. Rudman and Peter Glick and dis-
cussed in Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J.
SOC. ISSUES, 743, 759 (2000). That study does not appear in court documents either, though
it was referred to in several amicus briefs in the Wal-Mart v. Dukes case, 131 S.Ct. 2041
(2011). See briefs at 2011 WL 757411; 2011 WL 757409.
18. See studies discussed in David L. Faigman et al., A Matter of Fit, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 1389, 1418–22 (2008) (especially studies regarding backlash toward women in leader-
ship roles).
19. See THE DOUBLE-BIND DILEMMA, supra note 14, at 5.
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whole picture, framed by studies that explain what we are seeing.
But is it enough to get past summary judgment?
C. Juries Should See These Studies
The studies would help juries understand that even those em-
ployers that believe they are fighting against bias are unconsciously
applying biased expectations to the workplace. And that those un-
conscious biases might override their rational decision making, re-
sulting in a decision they assumed was based on poor performance
or failure to be one of the team but really was based on the implicit
expectation that women would meet the stereotyped expectations and
disappointment or dissatisfaction when they don’t. It would further
help juries understand that the reduction in the employer’s percep-
tion does not affect employment overnight, but over time.
The difficult question is how to use this information for the
everyday case—the individual who does not have statistics to back
up her claim, who knows she was discriminated against but does not
necessarily have strong evidence to convince a jury. And in a conser-
vative district, where without strong evidence she likely won’t even
convince the judge to let her tell her story to the jury, can this social
science research put the “I know it when I see it” case in a perspec-
tive that gets past summary judgment?
Can we prove in court that a particular employer discriminated
because we know that part of the reason women still earn less than
men, that women are not reflected in positions of power and leader-
ship in anywhere near the numbers that men are, is our societal
biases, our protective instincts, and especially our stereotyped think-
ing? Is the simple fact that a woman was overlooked or let go and the
employer’s reason “doesn’t make sense” enough to let a jury decide
whether the employer’s decision is based on a discriminatory motive?
Not an overt intent, perhaps, but an unknowingly biased decision
that, once publicized and admonished, the employer will take steps
to make sure will not happen again.
These studies fill in the missing link, showing that this subtle
bias, applied in small ways over time, adds up to an eventual ad-
verse action against a woman simply because she has always been
a woman. Only when employers truly confront and address these
implicit biases (perhaps) can we truly make progress toward closing
the gaps.
The question to be answered is whether, under current discrim-
ination law, theory meets practice. Applying Title VII theory and
precedent, it seems obvious that a jury should assess whether the
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anecdotal evidence of the “I know it when I see it” case, met with the
social science research about implicit bias, proves a discriminatory
motive. But, in a world of overcrowded dockets, judges who arguably
have embraced summary judgment as a method for case manage-
ment,20 and perhaps even cynical juries, is it enough?
Courts allow in evidence of societal norms or beliefs in many
contexts. In the typical class action discrimination suit, argued under
the disparate impact theory, an expert provides statistics to show
that women generally are not being hired or promoted by the defen-
dant employer in numbers that make sense given women in similar
businesses or fields. The expert testifies that the disparities are sta-
tistically significant—that they cannot occur without a cause. To the
statistics reflecting that women rarely—or never—get hired for these
jobs at this company the parties add stories of men being hired despite
lower qualifications, or testimony by former managers who repeat
quotes from senior managers that they just don’t think whatever
woman worked up the nerve to apply for this traditionally male job
“fits in” or “has what it takes.”
Then, a different expert provides the “social framework,” the
background based on social science research. The expert can testify
that numerous studies have shown that male managers hire people
who look, think, and act like them—mainly men, often white men of
a certain age.21 Alternately, the expert might testify that studies show
that implicit bias might keep women out of certain types of jobs be-
cause American society perpetuates the belief that sales directors,
stockbrokers, police officers, CEOs, and other aggressive careers re-
quire male employees who can meet that aggressive stereotype.22
While undoubtedly helpful in a disparate impact case, social
framework evidence may be the most useful evidence in an individual
disparate treatment case where the evidence is wholly circumstantial
and the discriminatory motive is not obvious. Most helpful to the indi-
vidual, small-value case, this expert “framework” testimony is often
not based on the expert’s own research but instead is based on the
expert’s gathering and summation of studies done by others. It is
20. Hon. Mark W. Bennett, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary
Judgment Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 688 (2012–2013) (asserting that judges act more like case man-
agers rather than trial judges now and use summary judgment as a tool to help manage
their dockets).
21. Barbara J. Fick, The Case for Maintaining and Encouraging the Use of Voluntary
Affirmative Action in Private Sector Employment, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 159, 167 (1997).
22. See, e.g., studies discussed in Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 1412–16.
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admissible under Daubert23 because it is “relevant to the task at
hand” and it rests “on a reliable foundation.” 24 Used this way, pre-
senting expert testimony may not be prohibitively expensive.25 In
cases where the evidence is not strong, and where the wisdom of in-
vesting in an expert is questionable, allowing the expert to take that
discussion to the next level and offer an opinion that even a case with
limited specific facts, given all we now know about implicit bias, in-
dicates a discriminatory motive.
How do you convince a court that is inclined to grant summary
judgment in discrimination cases that this social framework should
tip the scale toward allowing the jury to decide the sufficiency of the
evidence?26 I have found just one unreported case where the It Does
Hurt To Ask study was cited by a court—in an equal pay claim re-
garding negotiating salaries27—and only one where the Women Don’t
Ask study was referenced in an amicus brief.28 Although this lack of
citation does not definitively show that courts do not allow this evi-
dence in at trial, or that lawyers are not proffering it, the lack of ref-
erence in decisions granting or denying summary judgment seems
to indicate that is the case. The question posed by this lack of use of
seemingly game-changing research is whether it is a failure of civil
rights theory or practice, or both.
Part I of this paper will provide a short background on social
framework analysis and implicit bias or stereotyped thinking and
highlight some of the relevant studies. Much has been written in the
area, so I will provide only an overview, with references for those
who did not enter this discussion until recently. It will then discuss
Title VII and its proof requirements to get past summary judgment
23. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993).
24. Id. at 584–87. For a discussion of the admissibility of this evidence, see infra
Part II.
25. Unfortunately, several recent articles have asserted that the expert’s testimony
must stop there unless the expert conducts research specific to this particular employer.
See discussion of Monahan, Walker & Mitchell, Contextual Evidence, infra note 34, at 1718;
Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 1432; infra Part III.
26. See Bennett, supra note 20, at 710 (arguing that judges overuse summary judgment
so much that we should eliminate it for a period of time to determine whether the system
can stand trying the employment discrimination cases now eliminated without trial); Kevin
M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 127 (2009) (asserting that
courts grant summary judgment in employment discrimination cases, in whole or in part,
in eighty percent of all cases, and that even the few cases that win at trial are more likely
be overturned on appeal than other appeals).
27. Dreves v. Hudson Grp. Retail, 2013 WL 2634429 (D.Vt. June 12, 2013).
28. Brief of the National Partnership for Women & Families et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)
(No. 05-1074), at 8–9.
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and to the jury. Part II will discuss the uses for the expert testimony
and the studies on which they base the testimony—how it is admis-
sible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. It will also provide some
review of the types of cases that have allowed this type of evidence
and those that have not, and discuss how the studies relate to the
theories that apply to employment discrimination cases. Part III
will talk about the specific negotiation studies and their implica-
tions for the workplace, both theoretically and practically. Finally,
it will talk about where and how these studies may add value to the
employment discrimination discussion.
I. SOCIAL FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS—WHAT IT IS,
HOW IT IS STUDIED, AND HOW IT APPLIES
Although social science research has long been used in litigation,
the term “social framework” appears to have been coined by John
Monahan and Laurens Walker in 1987 to refer to “the use of general
conclusions from social science research in determining factual issues
in a specific case.” 29 The idea of providing a social framework was
to provide a general theory from which predictions could be made in
previously unexplored circumstances.30 The terms have changed and
the study has expanded over the years, but the basic idea of social
framework analysis is that “general research results are used to con-
struct a frame of reference or background context for deciding factual
issues crucial to the resolution of a specific case.” 31
As will be discussed later, such frameworks have been considered
by the courts in various contexts. In what might loosely be called
early (and unsuccessful) civil rights litigation, the Supreme Court
relied on “abundant testimony of the medical fraternity” to perpetuate
the stereotype that women were frail and needed to be protected in
Muller v. Oregon, upholding work hour limitations for women.32 Al-
most fifty years later, social science testimony was used in Brown v.
Board of Education33 to support the Court’s conclusion that separate
29. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 570 (1987) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan, Social
Frameworks].
30. Id. at 570 n.31.
31. Id. at 559.
32. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 418–22 (1908) (differentiating Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the Court reversed a conviction for violation of a New
York law limiting hours for bakers because it was not related to health, which the state
is allowed to regulate).
33. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954), and accompanying text; see
also discussion in Sanjay Mody, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social
Science and the Supreme Court’s Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 802 (2002).
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is not equal.34 Also oft-discussed, it was used in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins to show how not promoting a female because she does not
meet gender-based stereotypes creates a valid discrimination claim
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.35
Fortunately, most Americans have come a long way from the
Court’s misguided analysis in Muller. But despite consistent efforts
to rid the workplace of discrimination, it persists. Seemingly innu-
merable studies have been done that demonstrate the continued per-
sistence of stereotyped thinking, even in those who don’t think they
use stereotypes.36 For example, numerous studies show that “men
are typically judged as more agentic, or achievement oriented, than
women, whereas women are typically judged as more communal, or
interpersonally oriented than men.” 37 Since achievement orientation
is considered necessary for good leadership, men are assumed to be
better leaders.38 Thus, other studies show, when women act commu-
nally, which is consistent with gender stereotypes, they are viewed as
less competent leaders, but as having effective interpersonal skills,
and when women act aggressively or in other ways that are incon-
sistent with such stereotypes, they are considered as competent but
not as effective interpersonally.39
There are also studies that show the long-term and cumulative
effects of this stereotyped thinking on the workplace. They show that
34. Monahan and Walker asserted that the testimony in Brown was “social authority”
evidence, which is “general social science evidence presented to establish the validity of a
factual assumption underlying a legal standard.” Melissa Hart & Paul Secunda, A Matter
of Context: Social Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 44 (2009). Social framework testimony arguably includes social
authority testimony, and Brown remains a sufficiently good example to warrant the hope-
fully minor transgression. John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual
Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of Social Framework, 94 VA. L. REV.
1715, 1720–21 (2008) [hereinafter Monahan, Walker, & Mitchell, Contextual Evidence];
Hart & Secunda, supra, at 57–58 (questioning whether the distinctions between social
framework and social authority make a difference if the evidence is admissible under the
rules of evidence).
35. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235–37 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 107, as recognized in Land-
graf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2013)).
36. See John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt:
A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten
Studies That No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RESEARCH IN ORG. BEHAV. 39, 43 (2009) [here-
inafter Ten Studies]; Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association
Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 19 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH., 17,
19 (2009) [hereinafter Understanding the IAT].
37. Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 1408 (discussing throughout the article numerous
studies that demonstrate implicitly stereotypical thinking and its effects).
38. Id. at 1414–15.
39. THE DOUBLE-BIND DILEMMA, supra note 14, at 19–21; see also Faigman et al., supra
note 18, at 1417–19 and studies cited therein.
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initial negative feelings engender an unwillingness to recommend
people for good work assignments.40 Other studies show that women
in positions of leadership or in roles they are not “supposed” to be in
can result in even greater stereotyped thinking about their compe-
tence in that role and even backlash based on those stereotypes.41 The
Babcock and Bowles studies are just a piece of the bigger picture42
and are supported by other studies that reach similar results.43
A. How Social Frameworks Apply in Employment Cases
There are several statutes that address discrimination in employ-
ment. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to government entities.44 Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended (Title VII), applies to private
employers, and states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . .
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. . . .45
The standards courts apply to decide both Section 1983 and Title VII
cases at summary judgment are the same.46 For ease of reference,
this Article will discuss Title VII, meaning to include cases under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
The Supreme Court has provided a clear understanding of the
distinction between the two types of discrimination cases under
Title VII:
“[D]isparate treatment . . . is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favor-
ably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or [other
40. Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 1412 (“Biased assumptions about competence,
in turn, affect people’s willingness to listen to a person’s opinions, to be influenced by that
person and to recommend the person for rewards. Several decades of research support
this pattern of implicit gender bias in judgments of competence and the granting of in-
fluence and rewards.”).
41. Id. at 1413.
42. For an overview of quite a few of the many studies and what they found, see id.
at 1408–13.
43. See studies discussed in Understanding the IAT, supra note 36, at 19–20.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2013).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2013).
46. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 n.1 (1993); see also Patterson
v. McLean Credit Corp., 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989).
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protected characteristic].”. . . Liability in a disparate-treatment
case “depends on whether the protected trait . . . actually moti-
vated the employer’s decision.” By contrast, disparate-impact
claims “involve employment practices that are facially neutral
in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity.” Under a disparate-impact theory of discrimi-
nation, “a facially neutral employment practice may be deemed
[illegally discriminatory] without evidence of the employer’s sub-
jective intent to discriminate that is required in a ‘disparate-
treatment’ case.” 47
In order to establish an individual disparate treatment claim
under Title VII as it was amended in 1991, a complainant must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) she is a member of a
group protected under Title VII, (2) she suffered an adverse employ-
ment decision, and that (3) her membership in a protected group
was a motivating factor in that decision.48 Evidence of discrimina-
tory intent may be direct, circumstantial, or inferred from statistical
evidence, and all evidence that the plaintiff presents in that regard
can contribute to the inference in a cumulative manner.49 Another
way to say this is that, in making its determination, the jury looks
to the “totality of the circumstances.” 50
1. Analysis Under McDonnell Douglas
The odds of getting past summary judgment are slim in a num-
ber of jurisdictions, where courts grant it, in whole or in part, in the
vast majority of cases.51 In order to get past summary judgment in a
Title VII case, a plaintiff must meet a pretty high burden. The basic
method is set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green52 and sum-
marized in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine:
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponder-
ance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second,
if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden
47. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52–53 (2003) (quoting Wards Cove Pack-
ing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645–46 (1989), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105, 105 Stat. 1074–1075, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k) (1994 ed.)).
48. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94, 99 (2003).
49. Green v. USX Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 807 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 814
(1990).
50. See, e.g., Mansfield v. Billington, 574 F. Supp. 2d 69, 84 (D. D.C. 2008) (following
Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
51. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 26, at 127–28.
52. 411 U.S. 792, 798, 805 (1973).
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shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee’s rejection”. . . . Third, should
the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. . . . The ultimate
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant inten-
tionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times
with the plaintiff.53
In order to establish a prima facie case, the first step in the
three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis in, for example, a failure to
promote case, is for the plaintiff to show “that (1) she is a member
of a protected class; (2) she applied for and was qualified for a pro-
motion; (3) she was considered for and was denied the promotion; and
(4) an individual of similar qualifications who was not a member of
the protected class received the job at the time plaintiff’s request for
the promotion was denied.” 54 The prima facie case in a reprimand or
termination case would be similar, changing the fourth factor to re-
quire a showing that others similarly situated (called “comparators”)
were not treated the same, i.e., that they participated in similar con-
duct but were not reprimanded as severely or were not terminated.55
The first three prongs usually are pretty straightforward and
easy to prove. The fourth prong is the one that is nearly impossible
in many discrimination cases. Finding adequate comparators may be
impossible in the case where the plaintiff is in a unique job, where
other employees have come and gone over the years, and where
there is not just one incident that makes up the evidence of discrimi-
nation or the circumstances are much more general—not significant
incidents but instead small circumstances that add together to create
a picture.
At the last stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff
“may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a dis-
criminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.” 56 This lack of credence showing is called “pretext.” If the
53. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 805 (1973); Texas Dep’t of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
54. White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 429 F.3d 232, 240 (6th Cir. 2005).
55. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 857 (7th Cir. 2012); Wright v. Murray
Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2006).
56. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530
U.S. 133, 148 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to
find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to con-
clude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.”).
588 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 20:573
plaintiff can satisfy all of these burdens, she should be allowed to
take this evidence to a jury and convince a jury that it is more likely
than not that the employer’s adverse action resulted from a discrim-
inatory motive.
2. The Mosaic of Circumstances Analysis
In order to address the problem of finding comparators, courts
have recognized that other approaches may be taken. One such ap-
proach is to consider all of the circumstances and see if, taken to-
gether, they present sufficient evidence of discriminatory motive to
get to a jury. This is called the direct approach, or the “mosaic of
circumstances” approach.57
[T]he plaintiff’s failure to produce a comparator does not neces-
sarily doom the plaintiff’s case. Rather, the plaintiff will always
survive summary judgment if he presents circumstantial evidence
that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discrimi-
natory intent.58
In Smith v. Lockheed-Martin, quoted above, the Eleventh Circuit
allowed a discrimination case to go forward where the plaintiff could
not point to comparators who were “similarly situated in all relevant
respects,” meaning plaintiff could not meet the last prong of the
McDonnell Douglas test.59 On the other hand, the Court found, plain-
tiff pointed to circumstances that raised an inference of discrimina-
tion. For example, even though they did not meet the “comparator”
requirements because comparable employees were not supervisors
like the white plaintiffs, black employees who, like the white plaintiffs,
also sent racially insensitive emails were disciplined, not fired.60 In
addition, Lockheed kept a spreadsheet on discipline that noted the
race of the disciplined employees.61 Finally, the evidence showed a
strong motive to discipline white employees more than black em-
ployees after extensive news coverage of a rampage by a white em-
ployee against black employees that had taken place several years
57. Silverman v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2011) (upholding the
grant of summary judgment because the court was able to dismiss each alleged incident
from which a jury could infer discrimination as not reaching the threshold necessary to
get past summary judgment).
58. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011).
59. Id. at 1326–27.
60. Id. at 1343.
61. Id. at 1345–46 (citing Williams v. Lindenwood Univ., 288 F.3d 349, 356 (8th Cir.
2002) (“[I]njecting racial language at all into the decision-making process creates the
inference that race had something to do with the decision-making process.”)).
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earlier.62 Taken together, the Court found that was enough to raise
an issue for a jury.63
A plaintiff using the “convincing mosaic” approach to prove a dis-
crimination claim under the direct method may present any of
three broad types of circumstantial evidence. The first type in-
cludes “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written,
behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in the
protected group, and other bits and pieces from which an infer-
ence of discriminatory intent might be drawn. . . .” 64 The second
type is evidence showing that the employer “systematically treated
other, similarly situated, [not members of a protected class] em-
ployees better.” 65 Finally, the third type of circumstantial evidence
is evidence that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment ac-
tion and that the employer’s justification is pretextual. . . . This
type of evidence is substantially the same as the evidence required
to prove discrimination under the indirect method.66
Arguably, this standard should be much easier to meet for many
cases than the comparator test from McDonnell Douglas and should
result in more cases surviving summary judgment.67 Unfortunately,
though, the vast majority of decisions applying Lockheed-Martin and
Silverman continue to grant summary judgment on the finding that
plaintiff has not presented a sufficient mosaic to raise a triable issue
for the jury.68
3. Plaintiff Needs Only to Show That Discrimination
Was a Motivating Factor
In its 1991 amendments to Title VII, Congress clarified the lan-
guage, providing that “an unlawful employment practice is estab-
lished when the complaining party demonstrates that [a prohibited
62. Id. at 1344–45.
63. Id. at 1347.
64. Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 637 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Troupe
v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir.1994)).
65. Id. (quoting Venturelli v. ARC Cmty. Serv., Inc., 350 F.3d 592, 601 (9th Cir. 2003)).
66. Id. at 733.
67. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination By Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 736–37
(2011) (arguing that requiring comparators simply does not work in the modern work-
place, and specifically not where stereotyped behavior is a motivating factor).
68. Id. at 734–35 n.15. For example, of the almost ninety cases decided by district
courts in the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits that cite to the mosaic of circumstances dis-
cussions in Lockheed or Silverman, only three denied summary judgment in full. The vast
majority granted summary judgment in full, and the rest granted it in part. Westlaw
search, approx. June 15, 2013.
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characteristic] was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 69 In other
words, Congress clarified that discrimination need not be the only
factor; it just needs to be one factor. In its Desert Place v. Costa de-
cision, the Supreme Court clarified that discriminatory intent need
not be the only reason for the employment decision; it need be only a
part of the reason and put to rest any argument that a person arguing
that the decision-maker’s motives were mixed (meaning both discrim-
inatory and not) needed to show direct evidence of that motive in
order to succeed under Title VII.70
A number of scholars have argued that courts read this motiva-
tion factor as requiring proof of the employer’s intent, which essen-
tially excludes evidence of unknowing intent or implicit bias.71 Others
assert that it only appears that courts have added an intent require-
ment because they use the words intent and motivation interchange-
ably, but that courts understand that they need only find motivation.72
Arguably, what the courts are looking for when they assert that
plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent is a causal link between
an employment action and the plaintiff’s race, sex, or other protected
characteristic, not a deliberately or consciously discriminatory pur-
pose.73 “When Title VII is read properly, a plaintiff should be able to
show that an employer discriminated against her unknowingly,
notwithstanding the employer’s absence of deceit.” 74
4. How Social Framework Evidence Can Help in
Title VII Cases
Social framework evidence can and often should be a part of the
totality of circumstances considered by the court and jury.
In considering the totality of the circumstances, proof of implicit
bias potentially provides considerable information to the trier of
fact in at least two respects. Foremost, it can assist fact finders to
understand the complex realities of cognition and behavior that
underlie legal notions such as “motivating factors” and “intentional
discrimination.” In the simplest of cases, human motivations are
complex and enigmatic. Fact finders can use all of the help they
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2013).
70. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93–94 (2003).
71. See numerous articles cited and discussed in Katherine T. Bartlett, Making Good
On Good Intentions: The Critical Role Of Motivation In Reducing Implicit Workplace
Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1922–24, n.94 (2009).
72. Id. at 1924–25.
73. Id. at 1922.
74. Id. at 1924.
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can get. Second, evidence of implicit bias can help establish the
context for evaluating the facts of the respective case. Comments
or actions that might otherwise be ambiguous or seem tangential
to the dispute might take on greater meaning or more resonance
in light of this proof.75
Proving that discrimination was even part of the employer’s
motivation can be extremely difficult, especially where employers
are knowledgeable enough to have taken steps either to minimize or
to hide such motives or are unaware of their implicit biases. Social
framework evidence helps us understand discrimination that is not
necessarily intentional, but that can and should be eliminated from
the workplace.
Social framework evidence can help the judge or jury see how
what the employer characterizes as gender-neutral, such as leaving
decisions to managers at the local level, could allow for stereotyped
decision making. And it can be helpful to understand that an individ-
ual may embrace the law’s commitment to workplace equality even
as he violates its commands. “In fact, to the extent that it blinds him
to his own bias, the defendant’s belief in egalitarian values may even
be a contributing cause of his discriminatory behavior.” 76
In their 1987 article, professors Laurens and Monahan proposed
that this social framework research be submitted by brief or through
independent research by the court, turned into something like jury
instructions, and then read to the jury, much like law.77 That theory
makes some sense, as it would allow such research to be introduced
in every case where it is relevant and not just in those where the par-
ties can afford to hire experts. Unfortunately, according to the authors
in a 2008 article revisiting their proposal, courts have not created such
jury instructions based on social science research.78 Instead of creat-
ing jury instructions, courts have continued to rely on experts to
testify about social science research to provide a social framework.79
II. HOW SOCIAL FRAMEWORK TESTIMONY HAS BEEN
PROFFERED IN DISCRIMINATION CASES
Expert testimony has been used in discrimination cases from
early on. It helps in disparate impact cases to identify statistical
75. Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 1399.
76. Stephen M. Rich, Against Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 5, 22 (2011) (discuss-
ing studies that show that the more convinced an individual is as to his own objectivity, the
less likely he will be to attempt to moderate the effects of implicit bias on his reasoning).
77. Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks, supra note 29, at 588.
78. Monahan, Walker & Mitchell, Contextual Evidence, supra note 34, at 1731.
79. Id.
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disparities in hiring, promotion, and termination.80 It is especially
helpful in class action litigation where the connections between the
groups of employees being affected or the connections between
company-wide policies and individual effects might not be obvious
but for the expert’s testimony.81 Social framework testimony has been
used in employment cases to support the decision to admit general
research about sex-based stereotyped thinking.82
Expert testimony is admitted under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence if it is relevant and reliable.83 To make this decision, the
court looks to the test from Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., derived from Federal Rule of Evidence 104 of “whether the ex-
pert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will
assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” 84
Under Rule 703:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that
the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If ex-
perts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds
of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need
not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.85
FRE 704 removes the historical prohibition against the expert’s
opinion embracing the ultimate issue in the case, at least for civil
cases, though courts still struggle with whether and how the expert
should leave room for the jury to consider how the expert testimony
applies to the facts of the particular case. The Notes after the rule
state:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bar so
as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must
be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion
of evidence which wastes time. These provisions afford ample as-
surances against the admission of opinions which would merely
80. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339–40 (1977) (noting approvingly many discrimination
cases that rely on statistics to prove a violation of Title VII, and cautioning that statistics
can be refuted). But see Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2555–57 (2011) (rejecting both
statistical expert testimony and sociological expert testimony regarding the issue of
whether a class action met the Rule 23(a)(2) requirement of commonality).
81. It did not help in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, where the Court rejected the expert testimony
that attempted to demonstrate the connections. See discussion infra Part III.
82. See discussion infra Part II.
83. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
84. Id. at 592.
85. FED. R. EVID. 703.
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tell the jury what result to reach, somewhat in the manner of the
oath-helpers of an earlier day. They also stand ready to exclude
opinions phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria.86
For our purposes, while a court might exclude an expert’s opinion
that this particular employer did discriminate in this case, it should
not exclude testimony that, based on the expert’s studies and experi-
ence, these facts combined with the social science research that ex-
plains how they fit together could be found to show discrimination,
at least as one of the employer’s motivating factors.
The concern is not whether these studies are admissible, Walker
and Monahan report,87 but whether social framework evidence ren-
ders consequential facts “more probable or less probable,” as required
by the Federal Rules of Evidence.88 Though the social framework does
not provide certainty, it may provide probability.89
It would appear, therefore, that while social frameworks can never
in themselves establish with certainty the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to an issue at trial, they are surely capable
of providing information regarding the probability that something
did or did not occur. This is all that the concept of relevance re-
quires and all that sound policy would seem to demand.90
Because the standard in a civil trial is a mere preponderance of
the evidence,91 this framework arguably could provide sufficient evi-
dence, when combined even with seemingly ambiguous facts, for a
jury to find liability. Because a plaintiff in a discrimination case need
only prove that discrimination more likely than not was a cause of
the adverse event, probability and not certainty is sufficient. And
because circumstantial evidence is considered just as persuasive as
direct evidence,92 social framework’s emphasis on understanding seem-
ingly non-discriminatory circumstances should be key to getting to
a jury.
As will be discussed in Part II, infra, courts often find that social
framework testimony is sufficiently relevant and reliable and there-
fore admissible in some circumstances but not in others. Assuming
a court finds the social science evidence reliable, its usefulness is
86. Id.
87. Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks, supra note 29, at 572.
88. Id. at 587.
89. Id. at 575.
90. Id.
91. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003).
92. Id. at 100–01.
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relatively obvious in a disparate impact employment discrimination
case, where an expert explains what the statistics prove and how
the witness testimony and the statistics fit together, as explained by
social science research. The usefulness is not as obvious in a disparate
treatment case, where there are no statistical studies and the plain-
tiff must prove that this employer intended to discriminate against
this plaintiff in these particular circumstances.
Expert testimony showing how statistically there should be more
women in management or that stereotyped thinking might have led
to the failure to promote women throughout the company is an ob-
vious choice. In a disparate treatment case, where Plaintiff must
prove discriminatory motive, an expert can provide background for
understanding how a manager can say one thing and act another
way, even if he doesn’t realize it. Used well, an expert can provide
a framework from which a jury can analyze and determine motive.
But arguably, absent actual evidence that the manager intended to
discriminate (knowingly or not), even the best expert cannot get a
disparate treatment case past summary judgment, at least in a con-
servative jurisdiction.
Even using social framework evidence, Plaintiff must still show
that the biases predicted by the study actually caused the employ-
ment decision. Although the social science evidence can predict be-
havior generally, it cannot predict or “postdict” individual behavior.93
In other words, the jury must still find that this manager’s implicit
biases caused the employment decision in question, at least in part.
This lack of statistical company-specific data leaves the typical
disparate treatment case only with witness testimony and the docu-
ments the employer produces in discovery. Social science framework
studies could be helpful in those cases where the personalized studies
are not feasible. Just as the Supreme Court looked at studies that
showed that separate is far from equal in deciding Brown v. Board of
Education, general studies have a lot to offer a judge or jury inter-
ested in understanding why supposedly neutral employment policies
still result in discriminatory employment decisions.94
But are these studies helpful without the specific analysis that
applies them to the case currently before the court on summary
judgment? And is it appropriate for social scientists to opine about
a specific case without doing case-specific research, instead relying
on existing studies to find motive when combined with the witness
testimony? The issue becomes whether and when research that has
93. Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 1429–31.
94. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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been done in other industries, on different but related issues, or for
similar types of cases, can be introduced to help a jury understand
how the documents and witness testimony in this case fits into the
larger world where stereotyped thinking, biased decision making, and
the “good-ole-boy” network are alive and well, even in companies that
have taken steps to eliminate them. And the real question is whether
a court will even find that the plaintiff has produced enough evidence
to get the evidence to a jury.
A. How Courts Have Allowed Social Framework Testimony
1. Some Courts Have Allowed Social Framework Evidence in
Class Actions or Actions on Behalf of Groups
Courts long have looked to societal assumptions, statistical evi-
dence, and expert opinion to help them reach decisions. As far back as
Muller v. Oregon,95 the Supreme Court noted that “medical experts”
believed that women are weak and need protection from the rigors
of long work days.96 The Court relied on the importance to society of
women’s ability to be effective mothers to uphold as constitutional
laws that restricted the number of hours women could work.97 The
Court pointed to more than ninety “reports of committees, bureaus
of statistics, commissioners of hygiene, inspectors of factories, both
in this country and in Europe, to the effect that long hours of labor
are dangerous for women, primarily because of their special physical
organization.” 98 Then the Court went on at length and without cita-
tion to discuss women’s dependence on men, their different body
structure, and the importance of protecting women for society’s ben-
efit (child-bearing and rearing), not just their own, to justify the pro-
tectionist legislation.99
One of the most notable uses of general scientific studies that
provided a backdrop from which the Court could make a factual
95. Mueller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420–21 (1908).
96. Id. at 420–21. The court admitted that
The legislation and opinions referred to in the margin may not be, technically
speaking, authorities, and in them is little or no discussion of the constitu-
tional question presented to us for determination, yet they are significant of
a widespread belief that woman’s physical structure, and the functions she
performs in consequence thereof, justify special legislation restricting or
qualifying the conditions under which she should be permitted to toil.
Id. at 420.
97. Id. at 421.
98. Id. at 420 n.1 (referred to as “the margin”).
99. Id. at 422. All of that research does make you wonder what we will figure out about
the studies discussed here 100 years from now.
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determination was the studies identified in the famous footnote
eleven in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.100 Those cited
studies show the effects of separate education on the children who
receive it—creating a feeling of inferiority in those who receive the
allegedly separate but equal education, especially if done with the
sanction of the law.101 The Court cited the studies in support of its
holding that: “In the field of public education the doctrine of ‘sepa-
rate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are in-
herently unequal.”102
The Court has followed that practice in more modern cases. For
example, the Supreme Court relied on studies that show the ongoing
effects of poor education on minorities to justify continuing affirma-
tive action programs in Grutter v. Bollinger.103 Some of the evidence
was presented by experts regarding statistical studies of the school
system at issue. The rest was presented by social science experts,
offering social science framework studies, which the Court accepted
to help it frame its reasoning.104 There was no jury in the affirma-
tive action cases, so it is unknown whether the Court would have
allowed some or all of the studies to be presented to a jury making
a factual determination.
Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc. provides a good example of a court
allowing several experts to provide evidentiary testimony in a class
action disparate treatment case.105 In that case, Plaintiffs argued
that the Lucky Stores grocery chain discriminated against women by
putting them in jobs with little chance for promotion and with lower
pay, not offering them as many hours, including overtime hours, as
men, and that Defendant usually ignored seniority in its promotion
decisions, leaving decisions to the discretion of supervisors with little
100. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). There have been many articles written on how the Court
used the studies, whether the Justices actually relied upon them, and whether they should
have been used. See Mody, supra note 33 for an overview of the many different approaches
and an argument that the Court did not, in fact, rely on the studies to reach its decision but
instead used them to lend authoritative force to its own conclusion.
101. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
102. Id. at 495.
103. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 345 (2003) (citing to statistics used in the dis-
sents in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298–301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) and
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 272–74 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting));
see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring
and citing numerous studies to support his argument that Grutter v. Bollinger should
be overruled and that the Court should hold that considering “race in higher education
admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause”).
104. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
105. 803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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guidance, further limiting women’s opportunities for advancement.106
The court spent a great deal of time walking through the expert tes-
timony—two statistical experts plus two social science experts for
Plaintiffs, and similar experts for Defendants. The court credited
Plaintiffs’ experts107 and rejected Defendant’s experts, ultimately find-
ing that Plaintiffs had proffered more than sufficient evidence of
discrimination—based both on the statistically significant dispari-
ties and the anecdotal testimony of sexist comments and admitted
assumptions about women not wanting the “more important” jobs or
more hours and choosing the jobs into which they were shepherded.108
Similarly, in Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., the court refused to
accept Plaintiff’s proffered statistical evidence of discriminatory hiring,
promotions, and terminations, but accepted the social science frame-
work evidence to help it understand the testimony regarding hostile
environment.109 In that case, the expert suggested that the court look
for “(1) rarity; (2) sexualized work environment; and (3) ambiguous
criteria for evaluating employee performance” to determine whether
the workplace was a sexually hostile environment.110 The Court stated:
Although the Court’s findings and conclusions would remain the
same absent Dr. Borgida’s testimony, his testimony on sexual
stereotyping provides a sound, credible theoretical framework
that confirms the Court’s conclusion that the presence of the
visual materials as well as verbal and physical behaviors previ-
ously described constitute acts of sexual harassment. In addition,
sexual stereotyping generally, and “priming” research specifically,
provide a framework for understanding why consistent and per-
vasive acts of sexual harassment occur in work environments
similar to Eveleth Mines.111
But generalized conclusions, especially statistics, usually are
insufficient to prove disparate treatment. In McDonnell Douglas,
the Supreme Court remanded to the district court for a determina-
tion of whether the plaintiff proved that a particular refusal to re-
hire was discriminatory.112 The statistics showed that there were few
minorities in the job.113 The Court cautioned that, while that evidence
106. Id. at 266, 298, 333.
107. Id. at 326, 333 (omitting one social science expert who testified regarding a job
interest survey, which the court refused to accept in a disparate treatment case).
108. Id. at. 327, 332.
109. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 880–81 (D. Minn. 1993).
110. Id. at 881 (footnotes omitted).
111. Id. at 882–83 (quoting Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1505
(M.D. Fla. 1991)).
112. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 792 (1973).
113. Id. at 805, n.19.
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was probative, it was not enough: “We caution that such general de-
terminations, while helpful, may not be in and of themselves con-
trolling as to an individualized hiring decision, particularly in the
presence of an otherwise justifiable reason for refusing to rehire.”114
2. Some Courts Have Not Accepted the Proffered
Expert Testimony
Courts do not necessarily reject statistical or social science re-
search per se. Instead, they determine that the proffered evidence
is inadmissible because either it is not relevant to the case at hand
or it is not reliable, as required by Daubert.115 Perhaps the best known
example of social science studies rejected in recent employment cases
were those offered in the Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes class action.116
Those studies were roundly rejected not only by Justice Scalia and
the majority of the Supreme Court,117 but also by some of the expert
witness’s colleagues in the social science field.118 In Dukes, the ex-
pert reviewed current social science research to provide a framework
for understanding the statistical studies the plaintiffs relied on to
attempt to show that the class had sufficient commonality to meet
the class action requirements.119
The expert started by discussing the broad framework—the cir-
cumstances that allow or encourage companies to engage in stereo-
typed thinking.120 Then he looked at Walmart’s policies and practices
and compared them to the social science research, especially the
research that shows that leaving decisions in the hands of mid-level
managers leads to subjective and often stereotyped thinking and
therefore discriminatory decision-making.121 Thus, the expert as-
serted, Walmart’s nationwide policy of giving managers broad dis-
cretion and little guidance makes the issue of discrimination common
throughout Walmart.122
114. Id.
115. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993).
116. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555 (2011).
117. Id.
118. Monahan, Walker & Mitchell, Contextual Evidence, supra note 34, at 1747–48.
119. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555.
120. Id. at 2553.
121. Id. at 2553–54.
122. Id. at 2554. But see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990–91
(1988) (recognizing that subjective decision making by itself does not raise an inference of
discrimination, but stating, “If an employer’s undisciplined system of subjective decision-
making has precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional
discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title VII’s proscription against discriminatory
actions should not apply”). The Court in Dukes specifically stated that the finding of
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That argument went straight to the issue of commonality under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the rule for deciding whether to
certify a class action.123 The Court could have allowed the expert’s
testimony to help show that if a jury found discrimination against
Walmart employees, it could attribute that discrimination to Walmart
and not just individual decision makers. Instead, the Supreme Court
rejected the expert’s testimony because, it stated:
He could not, however, “determine with any specificity how reg-
ularly stereotypes play a meaningful role in employment deci-
sions at Wal-Mart. At his deposition . . . Dr. Bielby conceded that
he could not calculate whether 0.5 percent or 95 percent of the
employment decisions at Wal-Mart might be determined by stereo-
typed thinking.”124
The expert’s application of social science research to the issue of com-
monality, the Supreme Court said, needs more specificity.125 In other
words, the Supreme Court rejected the expert’s testimony in favor
of class certification because he could not show definitively that the
policies caused the allegedly discriminatory employment decisions,
which arguably is not what social framework testimony should do.126
Interestingly, both the Supreme Court’s reasoning and the ex-
pert’s social framework testimony were rejected by the very social
scientists who coined the term “social framework” because, they ar-
gued, the conclusions the expert reached with regard to the likelihood
of discriminatory decisions at Walmart are best left to the jury.127
Dr. Monahan and his colleagues disagreed with the Supreme Court’s
rejection of the expert’s testimony because his framework testimony
should have raised a jury question.128 But they also disagreed with
the expert because, they argued, his conclusions as to Walmart’s hir-
ing practices needed to be based on his own independent scientific
research rather than on the statistical evidence combined with wit-
ness testimony.129
commonality for a class action is different than the finding of an inference of discrim-
ination and specifically did not abrogate Watson, though it relied on the statement in
Watson that an employee must point to a specific employment action as discriminatory
to explain why that could not be determinative in the case at hand. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct.
at 2555–56.
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
124. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. 189, 192 (N.D.
Cal. 2004)).
125. Id.
126. See Hart & Secunda, supra note 34, at 57.
127. Id. at 56.
128. Monahan, Walker & Mitchell, Contextual Evidence, supra note 34, at 1743.
129. Id. at 1747.
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Of course, there is some logic to the argument that an expert
hired to talk in broad generalities about a framework for analysis
should not also try to offer the ultimate conclusion as to whether that
stereotyped thinking (explicit or implicit) caused the statistical anom-
aly that women aren’t being hired, promoted, given opportunities,
etc., in proportions that they should be.130 But the expert’s testimony
was not given to prove the ultimate fact—whether discrimination
definitely occurred.131 That was for the jury. Given the policies that
traditionally allow for discriminatory decision making, plus witness
testimony, a reasonable jury might find that Walmart discriminated.
And in this case the issue was even simpler—could it be possible that
the employees nationwide, employed in different jobs for different
stores with different managers, experienced discrimination because
of Walmart’s policies, practices, or culture? In other words, is it pos-
sible that discrimination was common to the plaintiffs in the action?
Cases following Wal-Mart have been more careful in their
analyses.132 They still use both statistical and social framework evi-
dence, but they make sure to point to specific employment practices
and to show how the corporate culture has created a common ap-
proach to decision-making, which has led to discrimination.133 For
example, in Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., the Ninth Circuit re-
manded a class certification request for more specific findings,134
and the District Court went into great detail to show how the social
framework evidence helped understand the common culture and how
the lack of strong guidance for decision-making at Costco could lead
to discrimination.135
B. Social Framework Research in Individual Disparate
Treatment Cases
1. Courts Have Allowed Social Framework Research in
Individual Disparate Treatment Cases
The most oft-cited case allowing in social framework research
in the individual disparate treatment discrimination context is Price
130. See Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 1432 (arguing that such testimony should
be allowed, but that it should not go to the ultimate fact—did this employer apply bias to
this set of facts?); see also Hart & Secunda, supra note 34, at 62–63 (arguing that experts
should be allowed to proffer an opinion as to whether the policies are vulnerable to bias,
but that the ultimate issue of whether this employer discriminated is for a jury).
131. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011).
132. See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 540 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 493.
135. Id. at 520.
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Waterhouse v. Hopkins.136 In that case, the Supreme Court allowed
in Dr. Susan Fiske’s expert testimony that the partnership selection
committee that rejected Hopkins’ bid for partnership likely was in-
fluenced by gender stereotypes.137 In Price Waterhouse, Hopkins was
not promoted to partner in her accounting firm essentially because
the partners did not find her feminine enough. She introduced tes-
timony that partners told her that she was “macho,” that she needed
to attend charm school, and that “in order to improve her chances
for partnership, . . . [she] should ‘walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry.’ ”138 Fiske did no independent analysis and
merely analyzed the statements that were part of the record testi-
mony, testifying that, in her expert opinion, these statements indi-
cated that sex-based stereotypes affected the partnership decision.139
Today, it would be the rare court that would not find that such evi-
dence was sufficient to raise a question of gender discrimination for
the jury.
Arguably, Fiske’s testimony was not a framework at all, but
rather direct testimony analyzing and opining on the specific facts of
a specific case, though she did testify that she could not say whether
any one particular comment was the result of stereotyping.140 The
Court used her testimony to bridge the gap to understand that the
comments and the expectations for women, though not evidencing
discriminatory animus, did demonstrate treating women differently
because they are women, which, the Court clarified, is sufficient to
incur liability under Title VII.141
Another case that used expert testimony particularly effectively
is Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. In that case, the court ac-
cepted the argument that stereotyped thinking led to discriminatory
action.142 Robinson relied on Price Waterhouse ’s Dr. Susan Fiske.143
Dr. Fiske and related experts were allowed to testify about sexual
stereotypes and how they likely affected employment in a shipyard
where the men were allowed to hang pornographic pictures, where
there were few women in high level jobs, and where women’s job
136. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228 (1989).
137. Id. at 235–36.
138. Id. at 235.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 236.
141. Id. at 237.
142. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1505 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
Until 1991, courts decided discrimination cases; it wasn’t until the amendments were
passed to the Civil Rights Act in 1991 that juries heard these cases. Civil Rights Act of
1991, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1977A (West 2014).
143. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1502.
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performance was reviewed in the context of an all-male power struc-
ture where it was sufficient to say that a woman was not good at her
job because she was not “affectionate.”144 Having reviewed deposi-
tions and other evidence of discrimination at the shipyard, but not
doing any original research into the facts of the case, Dr. Fiske went
on to testify to her opinion that the conditions and many of the ef-
fects of sex stereotyping existed at the defendant’s business.145
Dr. Fiske offered some interesting guidance—that stereotyped
behavior is more likely to occur under the following conditions
(though certainly not only likely to occur under these conditions):
“(1) rarity; (2) priming (or category accessibility); (3) work environ-
ment structure; and (4) ambience of the work environment.”146 In
that case, Robinson was one of few women in the skilled craft group
in which she worked.147 In addition, the men pinned up photos of
naked women, which Fiske testified made them view women as sex
objects.148 Third, the people in the power structure were men and
therefore more likely to see women as the “out group” and therefore
less capable.149 The men were also more likely to trivialize complaints
about behavior by workers in the “in group.”150 Finally, she testified,
the non-professional atmosphere of the workplace contributed to
women being treated as sex objects.151
The court provided an excellent overview of how the expert tes-
timony fit with the facts proffered by the plaintiff.152 The court ap-
plauded her testimony, stating:
Dr. Fiske’s testimony provided a sound, credible theoretical frame-
work from which to conclude that the presence of pictures of nude
and partially nude women, sexual comments, sexual joking, and
other behaviors previously described creates and contributes to
a sexually hostile work environment. Moreover, this framework
provides an evidentiary basis for concluding that a sexualized
working environment is abusive to a woman because of her sex.153
Interestingly, the court rejected the defendant’s proffered expert
testimony, which relied on studies finding that simply looking at
144. Id. at 1502–03.
145. Id. at 1503.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1491.
148. Id. at 1493.
149. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1504 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
150. Id. at 1486.
151. Id. at 1504.
152. Id. at 1486.
153. Id. at 1505 (emphasis added).
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pornography does not promote sexual aggression in men and that
women are no more than moderately offended by seeing pornographic
materials.154 The court reasoned that the studies were not performed
in the workplace, so they were not relevant to the issue of whether
viewing pornography in the workplace can be offensive.155 In fact, the
court found, the defendant’s expert’s study showed the importance of
context in evaluating the response to sexually oriented materials.156
In other words, social framework evidence in the right context is not
only relevant, it provides an evidentiary basis, but social framework
evidence not directly related to the context of the particular case is
not relevant.
One issue courts face is whether to allow experts to testify to
the ultimate fact—whether the company actually discriminated—or
to stop their testimony at simply providing the framework.157 In
Robinson, Dr. Fiske did offer her own opinion, based not on inde-
pendent investigation but on the evidence presented by the parties
at trial, that the environment was indeed sexually harassing.158 The
court appeared grateful to have it.159 Arguably it was useful because
relying on an expert prevented the judge from having to worry that
his or her own assumptions might affect the outcome.160
The First Circuit has been generous in allowing social frame-
work evidence, explaining that the Supreme Court was adamant in
Price Waterhouse that evidence of bias, including unconscious bias
theories, is admissible to meet a plaintiff’s burden of showing that
disparate treatment, explained by the theory of unfair treatment
rather than discriminatory motive, still raises an issue for a jury
where social science indicates the possibility of a hidden discrimi-
natory motive.161 In Tuli v. Brigham & Women’s Hospital, both the
plaintiff and defendant sought to exclude the other’s expert from
testifying.162 The plaintiff was a neurosurgeon who was sent for
154. Id. at 1508.
155. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1508 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
156. Id.
157. Monahan, Walker & Mitchell, Contextual Evidence, supra note 34, at 1740 (arguing
that experts should not testify to the ultimate fact of whether a particular employer dis-
criminated without doing case-specific scientific research because of the risk that the
expert’s “preexisting beliefs, values, and expectations will bias the resulting opinions”).
158. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1503.
159. Id. at 1505.
160. See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 4, at 1002.
161. See, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman Kodak, 183 F.3d 38, 42, 64–65 (1st Cir. 1999) (denying
summary judgment where plaintiff had significant evidence of good reviews for many
years and then bad reviews under a new manager, leading to her layoff, where studies
showed that being the only minority member could lead to poor subjective reviews).
162. Tuli v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., 592 F. Supp. 2d 208, 210 (D. Mass. 2009), aff’d,
656 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2011).
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counseling as a condition of keeping her employment.163 She asserted
the peer review committee making the decision relied on statements
made by a particular doctor who harbored significant sex-based stereo-
typed thinking.164
In Tuli, the Massachusetts District Court allowed the plaintiff’s
expert to testify about the effect of sex-based stereotypes on employ-
ment decisions and that the allegations made in the case appeared
to meet the criterion for sex-based decision-making.165 The court rea-
soned that the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony as to indicators of stereo-
typed decision-making was admissible because the expert
cannot say whether a given act or word was discriminatory; he
can only show the settings in which discrimination typically
occurs and opine on whether the allegations in the case at bar are
consistent with the observed patterns. He allows the jury to make
the final decision and expressly disclaims the capacity to draw
any conclusion in this particular case.166
This case provides a good example of how social framework testimony
can help explain the situation without trying to tell the jury what
verdict to reach.
Defendant’s expert, on the other hand, tried to leave nothing to
the jury.167 For that reason, the court did not allow defendant’s ex-
pert to testify about “sham peer review.”168 The court reasoned that
defendants’ “sham peer review” expert was only testifying as to his
opinion as to whether the plaintiff experienced discrimination, a mat-
ter best left to the jury.169 The jury’s verdict of $1.62 million in com-
pensatory damages survived appeal.170 Especially because costs and
attorneys fees are awarded to plaintiffs who succeed under Title VII,171
the expert fees were justified in this case.
Similarly, in International Healthcare Exchange, Inc. v. Global
Healthcare Exchange, LLC, a New York District Court allowed in a
sociologist’s testimony regarding sex-based stereotyping and allowed
the expert to testify that the circumstances described by plaintiff
and limited evidence he reviewed led him to believe that “Plaintiff ’s
163. Id. at 210.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 215–16.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 213.
168. Tuli v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., 592 F. Supp. 2d 208, 213 (D. Mass. 2009), aff’d,
656 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2011).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-5(k) (West 2014).
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work assignments and termination were the product of such stereo-
typing.”172 The court reasoned that the expert’s failure to study all
aspects of the case were credibility issues for the jury, not the court.173
Arguably, the court could have kept out the expert testimony based
on a reliability argument under Rule 702 (finding that testimony can-
not be reliable when it is not based on all the relevant evidence), but
it left it for the jury to make that decision.174
2. And Some Courts Have Not Allowed It or Have Given
It Little Weight
Although statistics and other expert testimony can be very help-
ful in disparate impact cases, “Generalized statistics used to prove
a particular intent must be scrutinized closely.”175 “[S]uch general
determinations, while helpful, may not be in and of themselves con-
trolling as to an individualized hiring decision, particularly in the
presence of an otherwise justifiable reason for refusing to rehire.”176
Despite numerous cases that allow experts to testify to provide
background or a framework, at least one Georgia court has held that
Georgia does not allow subtle bias disparate treatment claims based
on subconscious cognitive stereotypes.177 In Tucker v. Georgia Depart-
ment of Public Safety, the District Court relied on Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins, and EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, for the proposition that the
disparate treatment must be “deliberate” or “conscious,” even though
those cases specifically held that stereotyped thinking is sufficient
intent if it causes employment decisions based on an illegal category,
regardless of any discriminatory animus.178 In Tucker, the court re-
jected the plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim without much expla-
nation.179 Hopefully this case is simply an anomaly—a decision by a
court that did not understand that social science research is admis-
sible as long as it meets the evidentiary requirements.
Other courts have found that the expert testimony simply does
not meet the Daubert standard.180 In Collier v. Bradley University,
for example, the court refused to allow an expert to testify that she




175. Johnson v. Bunny Bread, 646 F.2d 1250, 1254 (8th Cir. 1981).
176. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.19 (1973).
177. Tucker v. Ga. Dept. of Pub. Safety, No. CV-208-33, 2009 WL 2135807, at *6 (S.D.
Ga. July 15, 2009).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 571, 580 (1993).
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believed the employer discriminated on the basis of race based on her
analysis of social science studies and the anticipated testimony.181 The
Court followed Seventh Circuit precedent in noting that “When mak-
ing these determinations, the district court functions as a gatekeeper
whose role is to keep experts within their proper scope, lest appar-
ently scientific testimony carry more weight than it deserves.’ ”182
This “gatekeeper function” could prove the death knell of proffered
expert testimony in the kinds of cases discussed here.183
In Collier, the expert only read social science reports and the
transcripts of likely witnesses.184 She conducted no interviews and
made no attempt to verify the facts presented to her.185 Although the
court refused to determine whether this “content analysis” could be
sufficient, it found that this expert’s analysis was not.186 She did not
explain her methodology—she testified she simply read, analyzed,
and applied them to the case at hand.187 The court held that, since
she had no methodology, the court could not evaluate it.188
3. Cases Where the Lawyers Have Proffered the It Does
Hurt to Ask or Women Don’t Ask Studies
At least one court has been presented with Women Don’t Ask
study. In the Lilly Ledbetter case, the National Partnership for Women
and Families, along with numerous other groups, together filed an
amicus brief in favor of the original rule that pay decisions have a
cumulative effect and that each paycheck, if based on a discrimina-
tory decision, brings all paychecks within the limitations period.189
The authors of the brief pointed to the Women Don’t Ask study to sup-
port the proposition that early decisions regarding pay had long-term
effects, given raises based on a percentage increase (three percent
of $25,000 is less than two percent of $30,000, and subsequent raises
are cumulatively lower, resulting, according to the study, in a possible
181. Collier v. Bradley Univ., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1239 (C.D. Ill. 2000).
182. Id. at 1243 (quoting Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2000)).




187. Collier v. Bradley Univ., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1239, 1244 (C.D. Ill. 2000).
188. Id. at 1245. Arguably this expert was particularly inarticulate and non-specific.
Instead of explaining that it was accepted methodology to review and assimilate other
expert reports, she simply testified that she was not going to “label” the method she used.
Instead of explaining that it is an acceptable scientific method to expect some testimony
to be unreliable and not to quantify it, she simply assumed that some testimony was false.
189. Brief of the National Partnership for Women & Families et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)
(No. 05-1074).
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difference over a career of well over $300,000).190 The Supreme Court’s
decision did not mention the study, though Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
discussed many of the concepts raised by the brief.191
Until June of 2013, I had not found any cases where either the
lawyers or the amicus authors had cited to or argued that the It
Does Hurt to Ask study should be used as evidence or even should
be used to explain the evidence. The one case that appears to have
relied at all on the study is a claim under the state equivalent of the
Equal Pay Act. In Dreves v. Hudson Group (HG) Retail, the District
Court in Vermont conducted a bench trial in an equal pay and dis-
crimination case.192 The court noted the study with regard to the
equal pay claim, where the plaintiff’s replacement was paid consid-
erably more than the plaintiff had earned and the employer argued
that he had negotiated for it.193 The court pointed out that he was
offered significantly more at the outset of negotiations than she had
been making, so his negotiating did not show a lack of discrimination
in the initial offer, and pointed in a footnote to several studies about
the societal implications of women negotiating salaries.194 The court
did not discuss the study with regard to the employment discrimina-
tion case, ostensibly because the negotiation at issue occurred after
plaintiff’s termination.195
Had the plaintiff in that case negotiated for raises, promotions,
etc. throughout her long-term employment, it is precisely the kind of
case where the study would be the most helpful. The plaintiff had
very little evidence of gender discrimination. She alleged that the
store she managed was understaffed and that the boss talked to her
differently than the male managers and treated her differently, with-
out concrete and obvious examples of how that treatment was gender-
based.196 In its analysis, the court held that she failed to make out a
prima facie case, but went on to explain that, even if she had, her
explanation that she made her store successful, which warranted
better staffing, as the men had, was insufficient evidence because
she could not prove the employer’s proffered reasons for the different
staffing levels (e.g., a hiring freeze) unworthy of credence.197
It is not clear from the case whether the plaintiff ever sought
out recognition, a raise, a promotion, or, perhaps, better staffing,
190. Id.
191. Ledbetter, 490 U.S. at 228 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192. Dreves v. Hudson Group Retail, 211-CV-4, 2013 WL 2634429 (D. Vt. June 12, 2013).
193. Id. at *8.
194. Id. at *8, n.11.
195. Id. at *8.
196. Id. at *1.
197. Id. at *11.
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so we are left to wonder whether those facts, combined with the
Bowles study, would have been sufficient for a court that had already
accepted at least the premise of the study—women face different
societal pressures and results when they ask for what they deserve.
Instead, the court granted summary judgment on the plaintiff’s dis-
crimination claims.198
III. LAWYERS CAN USE THE STUDIES TO SHOW HOW
BIAS CREATES LONG-TERM AND CUMULATIVE EFFECTS
RESULTING IN DISCRIMINATORY DECISION-MAKING
The Women Don’t Ask and the It Does Hurt to Ask studies are rel-
evant as social framework evidence. Their relevance is less direct than
the statistical studies that show a particular workplace lacks women
in particular jobs because they require a judge or jury to understand
stereotyped thinking’s long term effects. That understanding simply
is not obvious to the uninformed observer, which is precisely what
makes them so essential. Once jurors, judges, employers, and even
employees are confronted with the fact that a single significant action
or series of seemingly unrelated actions can have long-term repercus-
sions, they can understand how what does not appear on its face as
a discriminatory motive may still stem from applying unconscious
stereotypes to decision making. Because of these studies, in the case
where discrimination built subtly over time without specific and ob-
vious discriminatory comments or actions, the discriminatory moti-
vation that was nearly impossible to see becomes visible.
In Price Waterhouse, expert Susan Fiske’s testimony was found
by the district court to be “icing on [the] cake” for the plaintiff, given
that plaintiff provided witnesses who testified that she was told she
was too “macho,” needed to go to charm school, and needed to walk,
talk, dress, etc. more femininely.199 In other words, the plaintiff proved
she was a victim of discrimination regardless of the social framework
testimony. The Court, however, appreciated Fiske’s testimony put-
ting the evidence in context and explaining comments that might be
less obviously sexist, including how the fact that she was the only
woman in her area might make a difference, and other findings from
social science research.200 Though it is questionable whether the
expert testimony changed the Court’s opinion, or had any effect at
198. Dreves v. Hudson Group Retail, 211-CV-4, 2013 WL 2634429, at *9 (D. Vt. June 12,
2013).
199. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
200. Id. at 235–36.
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all, the court did allow it in and even commented on its strengths
and weaknesses.201
Why isn’t using the Women Don’t Ask and the It Does Hurt to
Ask studies as straightforward as setting the social framework in
Price Waterhouse? Two reasons, at least. First, it takes more steps
to use the negotiation studies. The connection is not nearly so direct.
And second, the goal is to use these studies in cases with facts that
are not nearly as strong as the facts in Price Waterhouse, making
summary judgment likely rather than simply possible.
A. It Takes Multiple Steps To See Discrimination When Applying
These Studies
The facts of the long-term discrimination case do not simply rely
on statements such as “He said I wasn’t ‘nice enough’ ” and the ex-
pert explaining that “People say that when they harbor stereotyped
thinking.” They are often more nuanced:
Well, first I got the job and everyone was excited. I negotiated
my salary and the bosses seemed disappointed, but I got what I
wanted, so I didn’t worry about it. They did not mention or explain
their disappointment. Then, a couple of years later, I asked for
a raise and got it, but after a while I noticed that people started
to avoid me. Then I didn’t get the promotion I competed for but
I didn’t let that bother me. Shortly after, though, I started getting
undesirable projects and people stopped asking me to lunch. After
I asked for better projects and successfully negotiated (almost
forced) my way into managing the team for a prestigious project,
things really went sour. Nothing I did was good enough, and
everything I did was criticized, even though the team brought in
more business than some of the other teams through my aggres-
sive marketing efforts. Six months later, I was let go and told it
was because they no longer needed me.
And it is not just the facts that are complex in the negotiation
case. The social science research necessary to tie the facts to the law
is complex, relying on multiple studies, grounded by the It Does Hurt
to Ask study.202 Arguably, an expert who relied on the Babcock and
201. See Eugene Borgida et al., On The Use Of Gender Stereotyping Research In Sex
Discrimination Litigation, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 613, 614 (2005) (asserting that the Court
actually rejected the testimony as irrelevant based on its comment that “[n]or . . . does
it require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal
skills’ can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the
employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism”).
202. Bowles, Babcock & Lai, It Does Hurt to Ask, supra note 3, at 103.
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Bowles studies would have to take a court or jury through the ac-
cumulated scientific knowledge, leading to testimony that:
1) Most people have stereotyped thoughts, whether we know it
or not.203
2) Those stereotyped thoughts often affect decisions, sometimes
despite our efforts and sometimes because we make no effort to
control them, especially if the thoughts are subconscious or un-
conscious.204
3) Some of those stereotypes include women’s roles versus men’s,
such as believing that women should be “nice” and “communal”
and that women who negotiate on their own behalf aren’t “nice”
or “communal.” 205
4) When we hold stereotypes we typically think negatively of a
person who does not meet the stereotype (e.g., a woman who
negotiates her initial salary or who does not smile easily or who
refuses to wear makeup).206
5) These negative reactions persist not just in the short term,
but also in the long term.207
6) Those negative thoughts turn into long-term negative effects,
which affect the possibility of being included in the friendly net-
work of colleagues, being asked to attend social events at which
bosses get to know and like subordinates, being given a challenging
project which might affect your chances for promotion, and, ulti-
mately, getting the raise or the title or the management job.208
7) In addition, the chances for women to get that promotion are
slimmer because, the studies show, women are held to a stricter
promotion standard than men, based on actual performance rather
than potential performance.209
8) And if you try to negotiate your way onto the team or into the
social life, you end up in the same place. You hit the stereotype
that women who negotiate are perceived as too aggressive and
not nice enough.210
9) Also, studies show, women who are put in charge are often
criticized for not being good team leaders because they do not
exhibit the stereotyped behavior expected of them. They are not
nice enough; they act too aggressively, etc.211
203. Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks, supra note 29, at 575.
204. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117–18 (D.D.C. 1985).
205. Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 1408.
206. Id. at 1413; see also Bowles, Babcock & Lai, It Does Hurt to Ask, supra note 3.
207. Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 1415.
208. Id. at 1418.
209. Id. at 1414–17.
210. Bowles, Babcock & Lai, It Does Hurt to Ask, supra note 3, at 6–9; Faigman et al.,
supra note 18, at 1419–20.
211. Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 1419.
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10) So, if you accumulate all the effects of implicit bias, it is not
that the managers got together and decided she had to go; it’s that
they started to apply stereotyped thinking right from the first
time she negotiated her pay or her first raise, which immedi-
ately and throughout her employment hurt her ongoing chances
of success. And this finding holds whether the decision-maker is
male or female, stemming from the strong negative reaction to
women who negotiate.212
With all this evidence, the expert would testify there is a strong pos-
sibility that the company policy of failing to set specific guidelines and
not holding managers accountable for their decisions allowed the
company to let the plaintiff go at least in part based on gender-based
biases, conscious or not.
B. The Facts of the Long-Term Discrimination Case, Even
Combined with Social Science Evidence, Provide Only a
Tenuous Link to the Ultimate Employment Decision
What these studies tell us is that the incidents the plaintiff ex-
perienced very well could be related to and caused by the effects of
unconscious bias; even that there is a likelihood that they are. And
that is precisely the link that the jury needs to hear. Because, al-
though a comment that a woman needs to go to charm school or acts
too macho is pretty obviously based on sex-based stereotyped think-
ing, the relationship between negotiating and long-term negative ef-
fects is not obvious. The company liked the plaintiff enough to hire
her. And she stayed with the company for many years, getting raises
and good, if somewhat mixed, evaluations. And she got raises or pro-
motions and was not terminated until she had been at the company
for a number of years. All these facts militate against a finding that
there is sufficient evidence of discrimination to get to a jury. The
study explains a lot of things that just don’t make sense otherwise.
The court in Robinson held that the social science framework
offered by the expert “provides an evidentiary basis for concluding
that a sexualized working environment is abusive to a woman be-
cause of her sex.” 213 The question is the level of evidence a woman
has to be able to produce in order to be allowed to introduce social
framework testimony to a jury and let the jury decide whether, more
likely than not, the employer did discriminate in this instance. The
212. Bowles, Babcock & Lai, It Does Hurt to Ask, supra note 3, at 6–9.
213. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1505 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(emphasis added).
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argument that this standard should not be very high comes from Price
Waterhouse, in which the Court repeated the words of Title VII that
an employer cannot make employment decisions “because of such indi-
vidual’s . . . sex,” 214 and held, “We take these words to mean that gen-
der must be irrelevant to employment decisions.” 215 The Court went on
to hold that “Indeed, Title VII even forbids employers to make gender
an indirect stumbling block to employment opportunities.” 216 Finally,
the Court held that, “In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an em-
ployer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggres-
sive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.” 217
Arguably, then, all a plaintiff should have to show to get past sum-
mary judgment is that a reasonable jury could find from the evidence,
including the expert testimony, that sex, more likely than not, was
not irrelevant to the employment decision. This standard should be
especially easy to meet with expert testimony because, for every ex-
pert plaintiff offers, defendant is likely to offer an expert to say the
exact opposite, creating a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, judges
should be glad to allow this testimony in. Under that standard, most
cases should get past summary judgment. How can a judge determine
that sex was completely irrelevant when an expert in the field testi-
fies that there is a likelihood or even a possibility that discrimination
was part of the basis for the decision? Unfortunately, statistically
speaking, that is not the case.218
The problem is, even a liberal court is not going to let a case get
past summary judgment without significant and specific (even if not
direct) evidence of discrimination.219 Plaintiffs have to be able to show
that their qualifications were comparable to men who got promotions
or raises when they did not or who were not let go when they were.220
But that is not enough. They also have to show that being passed over
was caused by discrimination.221 As even the authors who coined the
phrase “Social Framework” admit, the framework studies do not prove
discrimination.222 The studies, though relevant to support and explain
214. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989).
215. Id. (emphasis added). This decision changed the standard applied by many lower
courts that discriminatory motive must be the “but-for” cause of the decision. Id.
216. Id. at 242 (providing the example of conditioning employment on facially neutral
tests or qualifications that have a disproportionate effect on a protected class unless those
tests are required for the performance of the job).
217. Id. at 250.
218. See supra notes 26, 50, explaining that judges are highly likely to grant summary
judgment in discrimination cases and to find against the plaintiff on appeal.
219. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Monahan, Walker & Mitchell, Contextual Evidence, supra note 34, at 1719.
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the evidence of discriminatory intent, may not be allowed to replace
the evidence.223
1. Arguments for Rejecting Social Framework Testimony in
Individual Disparate Treatment Cases
From a practical perspective, lawyers and judges must consider
whether evidence will help or hurt their case, confuse a jury, or preju-
dice the fact-finder. Although from an intellectual perspective more
information seems to be better, for trial purposes evidence needs to
be chosen carefully and for a purpose, especially when it comes at
great expense, as does expert testimony. A lawyer should consider the
efficacy of the evidence she intends to present, which raises questions,
discussed below.
a. The Studies Are as Likely To Prove as
Not Prove Bias, Because Employees Cannot
Control Their Unconscious Biases
One argument that these studies should not be allowed in is that
subconscious bias evidence really cannot provide any predictability
of a particular employer’s decision and therefore, jury decisions based
on them are as likely to be inaccurate as accurate.224 Because uncon-
scious bias is subtle, author Amy Wax argues, it will be hard for a jury
to figure out which cases really result from bias and which do not.225
Because of this problem, she asserts, “employers and firms will either
be dramatically undercharged or overcharged for their misconduct,
and compensation will often be paid to the wrong employees, with
deserving victims receiving nothing or too little and the uninjured
receiving too much.” 226 The argument really is that employers should
not be held liable for unconscious bias at all, since we cannot really
control our unconscious biases.227 The author likens subconscious dis-
crimination to accident.228 The problem with her assumption, though,
is that society requires us to pay for our accidents when we harm an
223. If Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), can be read to indicate a Supreme Court
move back to requiring proof of the decision-maker’s subjective intent to discriminate,
then this evidentiary standard becomes even more difficult to meet, and all evidence of
biased thinking and prejudice causing unconscious bias will become irrelevant. See Rich,
supra note 76, at 70 (arguing that Alito’s dissent indicates an intent to move backwards
in Title VII protections—for example, eliminating unconscious bias cases).
224. Amy Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1134 (1999).
225. Id. at 1133.
226. Id. at 1134.
227. Id. at 1133.
228. Id. at 1145.
614 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 20:573
innocent victim. And we as a society hope that we learn from the
punishment for an injury we did not intend and will be more diligent
to avoid causing an accident in the future. Because the same argu-
ment applies in a discrimination context, the analogy strengthens
the argument rather than weakens it.
b. Pressure to Stop Implicit Bias May Make It Worse
Author Katherine Bartlett believes that confronting and threaten-
ing people who mean well but have implicit biases makes them more
resistant to change and, ultimately, prone to more stereotyping.229
Instead, she argues, we should concentrate on a positive approach
so people do not become defensive or resentful about having to meet
expectations.230 In addition to, or preferably in lieu of legal threats,
the author believes “good intentions have their greatest comparative
advantage when it comes to the more subtle forms of discriminatory
behavior, and that people who have an internal commitment to non-
discrimination norms will combat implicit discrimination more effec-
tively than those motivated by traditional legal sanctions.” 231 The
author asserts that we can effect more change by presenting well-
intentioned employers with the studies that will help them confront
and correct their implicit biases.232 Of course, this approach assumes
that most employers are willing and able to take on this task without
any other incentive.233
This argument has immediate appeal—focus on the relationship
and encourage the best of people. Simply based on years of litigation
and mediation experience, though, I cannot shake the knowledge that
part of what convinces people to change their workplace for the better,
to take responsibility for the harm they may cause or have caused
others, on purpose or not, is fear of liability. So while I wholeheartedly
agree that employers and others should be exposed to social science
research and encouraged to recognize bias and eliminate it, I must
229. Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good On Good Intentions: The Critical Role Of
Motivation In Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1939–41
(2009) (pointing to studies that show that people often do not internalize externally im-
posed norms, perhaps because having too many rules trains people to follow the rules and
not develop their own judgment, or because it leads people to become defensive toward
the rules, or even because it angers people to think that rule-makers believe they would
not otherwise meet the standards). These are all legitimate concerns and the author is
wise to recognize that society must address them. She also recognizes that her approach
cannot be the only approach taken, and that legal means remain necessary. Id. at 1903.
230. Id. at 1936.
231. Id. at 1902.
232. Id.
233. See William T. Bielby, Accentuate The Positive: Are Good Intentions An Effective
Way To Minimize Systemic Workplace Bias?, 95 VA. L. REV. 117, 117 (2010).
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take the cynic’s approach and argue that this step is but a small piece
of the puzzle, and will be more effective if the employer has incentive
to accept the conclusion that its bias is showing.234 The author cor-
rectly points out, however, that the various findings about implicit
bias “raise significant questions about the optimal role for law in
reducing discrimination,” 235 but that is a topic for another article.
c. How Will a Jury Respond to this Information?
It may be putting the cart before the horse, but a significant con-
cern for any judge, and indeed for the plaintiff’s lawyer, must be how
the jury will react to the evidence she wants to introduce.236 Will the
jury even understand it? Will it help or hurt? Will it make a jury more
or less likely to find for a plaintiff? Should the answers to these ques-
tions matter to a court determining whether to admit this testimony?
i. Will a Jury Find Against an Employer That
Is Not Aware of its Discriminatory Decisions?
Will a jury find an employer liable if it thinks the employer did
not even realize that its decision was caused by implicit bias? Espe-
cially an employer that has taken steps to try to increase diversity?
Could introducing evidence that the employer’s discriminatory actions
began as far back as plaintiff’s hiring five, ten, or more years ago
(perhaps prompting concerns but no formal complaints until recently)
backfire against plaintiffs? Could a jury say she should have done
something back then and refuse to do anything all these years later?
Will a jury say it is not going to hold an employer who tried not to dis-
criminate liable for discrimination just because its biases came into
play in a decision despite the employer’s efforts to combat discrimi-
nation? In other words, is introducing this testimony more likely to
make the jury find for the employer than for the employee? And even
if it finds the employer liable, what effect will this knowledge have
on the damages the jury awards?
This concern is a legitimate one that should be considered by
plaintiffs’ lawyers.237 They must consider how they can convince a jury
that implicit biases, which most of us hold, are as much responsible for
this individual’s poor treatment at the company as for society’s failure
234. Id. (asserting that work on reducing bias needs to be aimed at organizational
structures more than individual motivation).
235. Id. at 1920.
236. Wax, supra note 224, at 1219.
237. Id.
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to reach true pay and job equity.238 Still, from a lawyer’s perspective,
the social science expert must at the least be proffered at the summary
judgment stage.239 It should be offered to help the court recognize that
what appear to be unrelated incidents could be connected.240 Whether
they are connected should be a question for a jury.241
But should it be a consideration for a judge in deciding whether
to consider or admit such evidence? Arguably not at all. The judge’s
only decisions are whether the evidence is relevant, reliable, or prej-
udicial.242 In addressing the issue of whether scientific studies might
be prejudicial because juries might give them undue weight, studies
quickly rejected that possibility.
It appears that aggregate “statistical” information, in actual prac-
tice, is likely to be highly undervalued by lay decision-makers.
Numerous studies have found that when people are presented
with social frameworks (often called base rates” in the research
literature) and with factual information specific to the case at
issue, they strongly tend to give less weight to the framework
than the logic of inference suggests is due.243
In other words, the worry is not that the jury will give the studies
too much weight, it is that the jury will give them not enough weight.
And so the first of many hurdles to using such evidence is overcome—
not such that a court should reject it as prejudicial; on the contrary,
courts could let it in as harmless knowing that a jury is likely to
ignore it. Even so, simply making juries, employers, and the public
sitting in on or reading about the trial aware of these connections
should help everyone understand and, hopefully, confront or at least
be mindful of these biases next time they make a decision. Is that
enough to justify the expense for a plaintiff’s lawyer? Likely not in
the individual case.
ii. Will a Jury Understand the Testimony
and its Place in the Evidence?
To expect a jury to accept the argument that, by coupling these
background studies with plaintiff’s meager proffered direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence, plaintiff has proved discrimination is really
238. Id. at 1230.
239. Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation,
40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 490 (2005).
240. Id. at 482.
241. Id.
242. See infra discussion of whether the lack of temporal proximity between events
or the tenuous connections between the events and the decision might cause a court to find
the studies irrelevant, Part III.B.4.
243. Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks, supra note 29, at 576.
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asking an awful lot of a jury. But isn’t that a jury’s job? We do not
really hesitate to argue that a judge can make these connections.
Should we think so little of our juries that we should not leave it for
them to accept or reject them? As with all evidence, it is for the wit-
nesses, presented by the lawyers, to make the connections, clarify the
facts, and explain how the evidence should lead to the conclusions
plaintiff wishes the jury to reach.
2. These Arguments Should Not Convince a Court To Reject
the Bowles and Babcock Studies in Implicit Bias Cases
Several of the arguments above leave us to wonder why lawyers
should bother, especially if we chance making things worse. The
answer also comes from the studies. The evidence shows that, when
we call people on their biases, they recognize them and work harder
to suppress them.244 And if people are successful in suppressing their
biases long enough to hire women and minorities in numbers suffi-
cient to change the dynamics of the workplace, the biases are likely to
dissipate.245 Seventy years ago a significant percentage of Americans
could not imagine going to school with children of a different race.
Today we cannot imagine it any other way. Once many of us figured
out that our biases were unfounded, there was no need for the bias.
Of course, we still have a long way to go, and will continue to combat
the significant effects of bias over time.
The argument that a jury will not credit or find liability based on
the social science research can be overcome with a little more social
science research, which can quickly and succinctly be presented to
a jury by the same social science expert.246 First, studies have shown
that individuals can, with conscious effort, suppress the effects of
stereotypes on their decisions and tend to do so under specific con-
ditions.247 For example, when individuals expect to be held account-
able for justifying their decisions as fair and nondiscriminatory, they
tend to examine the bases for their decisions and the impressions
their decisions will make on others more carefully, with the result that
they block the biasing effects of stereotypes on their decisions.248 In
a world where every manager receives training on avoiding discrimi-
nation, it would be impossible to argue that an individual should not
expect to be accountable for discriminatory employment decisions.249
244. Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 1427–28.
245. Id; see also Lee, supra note 239, at 486.
246. Id. at 498.
247. See Bartlett, supra note 229, at 1902.
248. Lee, supra note 239, at 486; see studies cited and discussed infra at note 277.
249. Those many workplaces where managers are not held accountable for discrim-
inatory decisions merely make this argument more relevant. A large employer that
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Second, the impact of stereotypic bias on decisions is reduced
to the extent that the standards for evaluating competence and
making employment decisions are explicit and clear rather than
ambiguous.250 And third, recent empirical studies have found that
situations that draw attention to successful women leaders or to
egalitarian social norms significantly undermine implicit gender
stereotypic judgments.251
Thus, one of the reasons we must continue to encourage the
introduction of the Women Don’t Ask and the It Does Hurt to Ask
studies is that, especially in cases where the long term effects of the
employer’s actions are less than obvious, by helping employers con-
front and correct their decisions, we as a society will take the next
step toward truly non-discriminatory employment decisions.
In particular, the studies discussed in this Article raise two
important concepts that employers need to grapple with: 1) that our
stereotypes are so ingrained that people who are consciously unbiased
(and those who have a strong interest in promoting non-discriminatory
decision making) may begin to think less highly of women simply be-
cause they asked for something they deserved; and 2) that the ef-
fects of these subconscious thoughts affect our decisions throughout
the entire working relationship. We need to recognize that we cannot
rid society of the persistent pay gap and equalize (or even get close
to equalizing) the number of women in positions of power until we
stop penalizing women for exhibiting the exact traits we believe we
need in high-ranking executives—someone who can demand as well
as command. The more we make these studies public, the more we
make people aware of the potential that bias undermines what they
believe is objective decision making.
3. Does Wal-Mart v. Dukes Make Attempting to
Introduce These Studies Pointless?
Arguably, the Court’s decision in Dukes takes us a step away from
holding employers liable for their unconscious biases. By finding that,
because Walmart provided little guidance and allowed individual man-
agers to determine which employees best exemplified “the Walmart
Way,” there was no common approach to employment decisions, the
knows it must not discriminate should not be able to escape liability by giving full
discretion to managers and not having to ensure the decisions those managers make are
not discriminatory.
250. Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 1427–28; Report of William T. Bielby, Dukes v.
Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. 189, 192 (N.D. Cal. 2004) at 31 (citing several studies that support
these propositions). Thus, an employer who avoids providing guidance for hiring, termi-
nation, or promotion decisions, knowing that subjective decision-making is highly prone
to discriminatory decisions is just as responsible as one who intentionally discriminates.
251. Lee, supra note 239, at 486.
2014]      WOMEN DON’T ASK AND IT DOES HURT TO ASK SHOW US NEXT STEP 619
Supreme Court arguably rejected the commonly accepted notion
that subjective decision-making can and often does lead to biases—
either conscious or unconscious—creeping into decisions and result-
ing in discrimination.252
Will the Court’s holding in Wal-Mart make lower courts more
reluctant to allow social science expert testimony into evidence where
the issue is proving liability and not just commonality? Arguably, the
considerations are different. First, a class action is often both a dis-
parate impact claim and a disparate treatment claim, or just a dis-
parate impact claim.253 The statistical evidence is necessary simply
to show the impact of defendant’s allegedly discriminatory employ-
ment practices.254 Adding social science research showing implicit
bias makes the import of those statistics abundantly clear.255
Also, in a class action commonality decision, the court focuses
on the uniformity of the facts across all the plaintiffs in the class.256
Arguably, the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart is inapplicable to dispa-
rate treatment cases, where the expert’s testimony is offered to show
possible connections between motivation and decisions by one or a
few managers and not uniform decision making across a company.
But the impact Wal-Mart is likely to have on the way courts treat
expert testimony in disparate treatment cases will still be significant.
The Court in Wal-Mart accepted the argument made by Monahan and
others that “ ‘a social framework necessarily contains only general
statements about reliable patterns of relations among variables . . .
and goes no further.’ ” 257
Based on the Federal Rules of Evidence and the constitutional
division of labor between the expert and the jury, . . . general
research findings cannot be linked by an expert witness to the
facts of a specific case. If linkages from general research findings
to a specific case are to be made, those linkages must be recog-
nized as arguments to be made by the attorneys, rather than
evidentiary proof that can be offered by expert witnesses.258
252. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555–56 (2011); see Watson, 487
U.S. 977, 990 (holding that discretionary decisions do not, by themselves, raise an inference
of discrimination, but “they do suggest a lingering form of the problem that Title VII was
enacted to combat”).
253. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2548.
254. Lee, supra note 239, at 493–94.
255. Id.
256. Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1222, 1266 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Wal-Mart,
131 S. Ct. at 2554 (finding sufficient evidence of commonality to certify a class based on
a specified employment practice with statistically significant)).
257. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554 n.8 (quoting Monahan, Walker & Mitchell, Contextual
Evidence, supra note 34, at 1747–48).
258. Monahan, Walker & Mitchell, Contextual Evidence, supra note 34, at 1718.
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In other words, the authors who contributed so much to the field have
now limited the usefulness of experts. Yes, expert testimony can
provide background. But there is nothing in the federal rules that
prohibits experts from offering opinions as to how that background
information could be applied to the facts of a specific case.
Monahan criticized the expert’s report because, he said it “reflects
nothing more than Dr. Bielby’s ‘expert judgment’ about how general
stereotyping research applied to all managers across all of Wal-mart’s
stores nationwide for a multi-year class period.” 259 Faigman agreed,
asserting that “Such a specific application of research evidence to
one case violates the assumption of the scientific method—i.e., the
notion that scientific findings describe general principles of human
behavior under certain conditions but they may not apply to every
individual in those conditions.” 260 Understandably, their concern is in
taking the issue from the jury. In an area where the links are simply
unclear without a sophisticated understanding of the wealth of social
science research and how it explains the facts and events at issue,
however, and in light of a rule of evidence that allows an expert to
testify as to an ultimate fact, it seems a step backwards to disallow
this kind of testimony. That the opinion is based on studied experi-
ence rather than on statistics does not make it irrelevant. As ever,
it remains for the jury to determine whether, given all of the evi-
dence, it accepts as more likely than not that discrimination was
“not irrelevant” to the case.261
C. Why a Court Will Not Be More Likely to Deny Summary
Judgment with the Expert Testimony than Without
Despite the fact that expert testimony is evidence,262 and de-
spite the fact that the expert’s job is to connect general evidence to
the specific evidence proffered by the fact witnesses, it is not possi-
ble for the expert in the weak individual disparate treatment case
to prove specific causation. Argument “based on speculation and con-
jecture” is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.263 The question
259. Id. at 1737–38.
260. Faigman et al., supra note 18, at 1432.
261. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989).
262. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502 (1991).
263. McDonald v. Village of Winnetka, 371 F.2d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004) (refusing to
find every conceivable inference, even in construing facts in favor of the nonmoving party
under McDonnell Douglas; not a mosaic of circumstances case); see also Graves v. St.
Joseph Cnty. Health Dept., 2012 WL 4118588 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 17, 2012) (holding that even
circumstantial evidence must lead directly to the conclusion that an employer was illegally
motivated, without reliance on speculation).
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is whether these studies raise facts and links between them from
speculation and conjecture to the requisite level of evidence to get
past summary judgment.
Even with the expert testimony, the plaintiff cannot prove that
a discriminatory motive caused the adverse employment action. All
the proof in the world that employers often harbor bias they are un-
aware of and that people perceive women negatively if those women
negotiate does not prove that this particular boss harbored any par-
ticular bias or that, if s/he harbored implicit bias, the bias was in
any way involved in the employment decision at issue. It just makes
it possible.
Is “possible” enough to get past summary judgment? Arguably
yes, because it makes discrimination “not irrelevant,” 264 but in a
conservative court still not likely—it simply is not enough to show
that discrimination might have been involved. Even if, for the sake
of argument, the evidence is sufficient to create a prima facie case of
discrimination, it would not meet the third prong of the McDonnell
Douglas test. It is not enough to show that the employer’s proffered
reason is false—instead, plaintiff must show that it is false and that
discrimination was the true reason.265 Background social science re-
search would not be enough to strengthen a weak issue of fact as to
whether the proffered legitimate non-discriminatory reason is untrue,
especially if there is “abundant and uncontroverted independent
evidence that no discrimination had occurred.” 266 The studies cannot
directly controvert the employer’s testimony that plaintiff was fired
because the company did not need her or she was the least respected
of the employees.
Even applying the “mosaic of circumstances” test, courts are
not likely to find that a weak case based on “bits and pieces,” 267
aided by studies, creates a triable issue of material fact. “A triable
issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff, presents ‘a convincing mosaic of circumstantial
264. See discussion supra note 215.
265. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the fact that Cuban Americans got terminated at a high rate was too weak to raise
a genuine issue of material fact without any specific evidence to back it up (citing Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) (noting that only that the
proffered reasons are not true is not enough to get past summary judgment)).
266. Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342–43 (11th Cir. 2002); Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
267. Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 637 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2011) (arguing the
mosaic of circumstances looks to “ ‘suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or writ-
ten, behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in the protected group, and
other bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn’ ”).
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evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination
by the decisionmaker.’ ” 268
A case applying the mosaic of circumstances test can
be made by assembling a number of pieces of evidence none
meaningful in itself, consistent with the proposition of statistical
theory that a number of observations each of which supports a
proposition only weakly can, when taken as a whole, provide
strong support if all point in the same direction.269
But to do so, plaintiff still must demonstrate “ ‘a real link between
the bigotry and an adverse employment action.’ ” 270 The circumstan-
tial evidence “ ‘must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the
employer’s action.’ ” 271
The cases where these studies provide the most insight are the
cases that fall into all the categories most likely to encourage a court
to grant summary judgment. For example, plaintiff might be able to
point to some stray remarks that appear somewhat sexist (“you’re
not nice” or “you’re too aggressive”) made throughout the employ-
ment, but not in the termination talk. Stray remarks are not suffi-
cient to raise an inference of discrimination.272
Plaintiff might show earlier arguably discriminatory actions,
such as failing to assign plaintiff to a prestigious project, that the ex-
pert could link to potentially discriminatory motive, but they would
be not be temporally proximate to the adverse action.273 Without tem-
poral proximity, a court easily could find that any evidence is insuffi-
cient to prove that the adverse action at issue was discriminatorily
motivated.274 A gap in time between the protected activity and the
adverse action weakens an inference of motive.275
268. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Silverman, 637 F. 3d at 734).
269. Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Villages Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 903 (7th Cir. 2006).
270. Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., 651 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting
that stray remarks might show boorishness, but not a link between possible bigotry and
the employment decision (quoting Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 762
(7th Cir. 2001))).
271. Cerutti v. BASF Corp., 349 F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Adams v.
Wal-Mart Stores, 324 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2003)).
272. See Waggoner v. Garland, 987 F.2d 1160, 1166 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that mere
stray remarks are insufficient to establish a claim); Ezold v. Wolf, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d
Cir.1992) (“Stray remarks by non-decisionmakers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the
decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly if they were made temporally
remote from the date of decision.”).
273. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 545.
274. See, e.g., Waggoner, 987 F.2d at 1166.
275. Wells v. SCI Management, 469 F.3d 697, 702 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying to a retali-
ation claim, where timing is most obviously at issue).
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And defendant may be able to assert that the same person who
hired plaintiff also fired her. “The fact that the same person hires and
fires a plaintiff creates a strong presumption of nondiscrimination.”276
Usually this “same actor” inference applies when the hiring and firing
occur within a short time frame,277 but this type of thinking makes it
even harder to prove that a boss who hired a woman could suddenly
decide, after years of successfully working with that woman, that
she simply no longer meets the boss’s stereotypes and should leave.
CONCLUSION
Social science studies offer an empirical method for replacing the
“common sense” or “intuitive” social science that judges rely on in dis-
crimination cases.278 Unfortunately, our common sense, when sub-
jected to empirical scrutiny, often turns out to be wrong.279 But law is
normative, and empirical research is descriptive. Law must provide
the fundamental principles upon which we base our claims. The goal
is to encourage courts and legislatures to base the rules and policies
that govern the application of these normative principles on empiri-
cally testable assumptions about human behavior and thinking.280
The two studies (and the innumerable studies that support, ex-
plain, and add to these two studies) discussed in this Article are de-
signed to provide precisely this guidance—to help judges and juries
understand that the evidence they see that appears to be sporadic,
ambiguous, and loosely tied together actually meets the standards
the courts have created to ensure that the norms set by Title VII are
protected. Unfortunately, because the studies are simply descriptive
of generalized behavior and because the evidence in the “I know it
when I see it” case is almost always weak, with an unclear link be-
tween the allegedly discriminatory actions and the adverse employ-
ment decision, these important studies are not likely to change the
world of employment discrimination through litigation.
276. Fahey v. Creo Prods., No. 96C5709, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12214, at *9 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (citing Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Group, 129 F.3d 391, 399 (7th Cir. 1997)); see
Krieger & Fiske, supra note 4, at 1044–45 (discussing the fact that this “inference” is really
a presumption, which a plaintiff must overcome with clear and convincing evidence). Of
course, the point of the cases discussed in this Article is their lack of clear and convinc-
ing evidence.
277. See, e.g., Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991) (“While we can imagine
egregious facts from which a discharge in this context could still be proven to have been dis-
criminatory, it is likely that the compelling nature of the inference arising from facts such
as these will make cases involving this situation amenable to resolution at an early stage.”).
278. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 4, at 1006.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1007.
